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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT
It is a truism that lawyers were the but-for cause of many of the corpo-
rate scandals that came to light in the summer of 2002. Without the partici-
pation of lawyers and other professionals, the fraudulent transactions that
had distorted the financial statements of Enron, Global Crossing, World-
Com, and other public corporations could not have closed in their original
form. But factual causation is one thing; responsibility is another. There
has been no shortage of public condemnation of the role of lawyers in fa-
cilitating corporate wrongdoing. When the last scandal of this magnitude-
the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s-became widely known, a federal
judge famously asked "Where . . . were the . . . attorneys"? Judge
Sporkin's cri de capur has become a convenient shorthand used by scholars
of the legal profession who believe, as I do, that lawyers have failed to take
seriously their responsibility as professionals while representing wealthy
Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Thanks to Greg Cooper, Roger Cramton, Sarah
Cravens, Tim Dare, Bob Gordon, Peter Joy, Doug Kysar, Jeff Rachlinksi, Tanina Rostain, Leila Sadat,
Emily Sherwin, Nancy Staudt, Dennis Tuchler, Richard Tur, Rob Vischer, Chuck Wolfram, and the par-
ticipants at the First International Conference on Lawyers' Ethics at the University of Exeter (U.K.) (or-
ganized by Kim Economides and Julian Webb) and a Washington University School of Law faculty
workshop for their perceptive and helpful comments. I am additionally grateful to Lonny Hoffman and
the students in the University of Houston Law Center's innovative legal scholarship colloquium for their
excellent responsive papers.
I Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990); see also Accountability
Issues: Lessons Learned from Enron's Fall: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 37-38, 47 (2002) (statement of Susan P. Koniak, ironically echoing Judge Sporkin's question).
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corporate clients. Lawyers have not yet been subjected to the kind of Con-
gressional grilling that officers like Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling en-
dured.2 And certainly no law firm has suffered the fate of Enron's auditor,
Arthur Andersen, which was convicted of obstruction of justice for attempt-
ing to thwart an SEC investigation and subsequently went out of business.'
Nevertheless, it is appropriate to ask the hard questions about the role of
lawyers in the most recent wave of corporate scandals, as well as in other
cases in which legal advice was sought by clients who appeared in hind-
sight to have been interested only in evading the law.
This Article is not a polemic against the rotten state of lawyers' ethics.
It is probably true to some extent that "[p]erverse incentives, not declines in
ethics, cause scandals." 4 When it comes to the role of lawyers, however, it
is impossible to talk about incentives-perverse or otherwise-without hav-
ing a very clear jurisprudential understanding of how lawyers ought to in-
terpret and apply complex and ambiguous legal norms to their clients'
transactions. In particular, we ought to investigate the responsibility of
lawyers, acting in their capacity as representatives of clients, vis-a-vis the
maintenance of a stable framework of legal norms. Do lawyers bear any re-
sponsibility for the system, or may they take a merely instrumental stance
toward the law, treating it as something to be evaded or nullified through
careful planning? If the technical requirements of law can be evaded to the
client's benefit and the detriment of others, is there anything in the lawyer's
role that prohibits her from assisting the client?
In this Article, I wish to defend what I call the interpretive attitude of
professionalism. Professionalism is a stance toward the law which accepts
that a lawyer is not simply an agent of her client (although the lawyer-client
relationship is obviously governed by the law of agency). Rather, in carry-
ing out her client's lawful instructions, a lawyer has an obligation to apply
the law to her client's situation with due regard to the meaning of legal
norms, not merely their formal expression.' A professional lawyer must re-
2 Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L.
REv. 1236, 1237 (2003) ("[T]he lawyers have, however, largely escaped responsibility for their role in
this nation's latest spate of corporate fraud ....").
3 See BARBARA LEY TOFFLER & JENNIFER REINGOLD, FINAL ACCOUNTING: AMBITION, GREED,
AND THE FALL OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN 221-22 (2003).
4 John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 278 (2004); see also William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Share-
holder Value, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1275, 1329-32 (2002) (arguing that the most plausible story of Enron's
fall requires understanding the workplace "tournament" culture, which created a bias toward winning
and an inability to perceive reality accurately); Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology
of Hyper-Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
968 (2002) (discussing cognitive psychological research on the production of firm cultures that tend to
lead managers to block out distracting concerns, like ethical issues).
5 Compare the principle of dynamic statutory interpretation, which requires an interpreter to con-
strue a text "in light of [its] present societal, political, and legal context." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dy-
namic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479 (1987). It is also similar to the principle
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spect the achievement represented by law: the final settlement of contested
issues (both factual and normative) with a view toward enabling coordi-
nated action in our highly complex, pluralistic society. The attitude of pro-
fessionalism has both negative and positive aspects. In the negative aspect,
this obligation of respect means that a lawyer must treat legal norms as pre-
cluding the moral and other reasons that would otherwise justify or require
a different action in the circumstances.6 Conversely, the positive aspect is
the demand that a lawyer should take a certain attitude toward the law,
manifesting her recognition that the law is legitimate-that is, worthy of be-
ing taken seriously, interpreted in good faith with due regard to its meaning,
and not simply seen as an obstacle standing in the way of the client's goals.'
Law is an achievement, but not one that will persist without custodians
and defenders. It is the job of lawyers to maintain the institution in good
working order, instead of subverting it.' As Jeremy Waldron puts it, any at-
tempt to circumvent the law should be accompanied by feelings of distaste
and dishonor,9 not pride in defeating something that is regarded as an adver-
sary. In addition, this obligation of custodianship demands that lawyers
provide a public, reasoned justification for an interpretation of legal texts-
of purposivism, familiar in legal ethics from the work of William Simon and David Wilkins. See Wil-
liam H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIs. L.
REV. 29, 62-90; David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REV. 468, 505-15 (1990).
Differences between these approaches will be apparent in the application of the attitude of professional-
ism to cases.
6 For a more elaborate defense of this position, see W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 363 (2004).
7 See STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 17, 35-37, passim (1992); Thomas D. Morgan
& Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Pluralist Society, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984 (1995).
As Robert Gordon argues:
[T]here is a difference between trying to game and manipulate a system as a resistance movement
or alienated outsider would, and to engage in a committed and good faith struggle within the sys-
tem to influence it to fulfill what a good faith interpreter would construe as its best values and pur-
poses.
Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L.
REV. 1185, 1200 (2003).
8 The obligation on the part of lawyers to maintain the institution of law can be understood as an in-
stance of the Rawlsian natural duty to support just institutions. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
114-17, 333-37 (1971). For a defense of the Rawlsian position, see Jeremy Waldron, Special Ties and
Natural Duties, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1993). In much of his work on legal ethics, Robert Gordon ar-
gues for a position very similar to the Rawlsian natural duty to support the basically just legal system of
our country:
Lawyers have, I think, fallen into the habit of thinking that maintaining the integrity of the legal
framework is always someone else's problem .... But, of course, the order of rules and norms,
policies and procedures, and institutional actors and roles that make up the legal system . . . [are]
only as effective as voluntary compliance can make it; for if people routinely start running red
lights when they think no cop is watching (or hire lawyers to keep a lookout for the cops, and to
exhaust the resources of traffic courts arguing the lights were green), the regime will collapse.
Robert W. Gordon, A Collective Failure of Nerve: The Bar's Response to Kaye Scholer, 23 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 315, 321 (1998).
9 JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 101 (1999).
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one which is plausible in light of the interpretive understandings of a pro-
fessional community.
Professionalism stands in opposition to the view of many lawyers that
excellence in lawyering means engaging in "creative and aggressive" struc-
turing of transactions for the benefit of clients, even though the transactions
are designed to evade regulatory requirements enacted to protect investors.
The quoted language, "creative and aggressive," which is often used by
lawyers as a term of approbation, comes from the report issued by Enron's
long-time outside counsel, Vinson & Elkins, in response to the concerns
raised by Enron finance executive Sherron Watkins."0 The firm, investigat-
ing transactions its own lawyers had worked on, despite the glaring con-
flicts of interest," determined that the only problem with the structure and
accounting treatment of the transactions was potentially one of public rela-
tions. The subtext of this response was that creativity and aggressiveness is
a positive value in sophisticated business counsel. Interestingly, Watkins's
letter itself used the word "aggressive" to describe the company's account-
ing, but she used the term with a decidedly more negative connotation-
suggesting that Enron had obscured the economic substance of transactions
to the point that the accounting treatment was no longer reliable.2
It is relatively easy to say, in the abstract, that lawyers should not be
"too aggressive" or should exercise judgment with due regard to the mean-
ing of legal norms. I hope to show that these general standards of profes-
sionalism have content when applied to actual transactions that fall within
the zone of professional judgment. In many of the Enron transactions, an
attitude of professionalism would have required the lawyers to refuse to is-
sue opinion letters where the transactions violated substantively meaningful
legal and accounting standards, even though the transactions arguably com-
plied with formal legal rules-albeit "aggressively."' 3  In other words, a
10 See LOREN Fox, ENRON: THE RISE AND FALL 259 (2003). Sherron Watkins was a vice president
for corporate development in the finance department of Enron at the time she wrote a letter to Kenneth
Lay warning that the company might "implode in a wave of accounting scandals." See id. at 247-48.
The complete Watkins letter is included as an appendix to her book. See Letter from Sherron Watkins,
Enron Employee, to Kenneth Lay, Chairman and C.E.O., Enron, reprinted in MIMI SWARTZ & SHERRON
WATKINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON 361-62 (2003) (regarding
Enron Accounting Practices).
I I WILLIAM POWERS, JR., ENRON CORP., .REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 176-77 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter POWERS REPORT] ("The result of the V&E review was largely predetermined by the scope and na-
ture of the investigation and the process employed. . . . The scope and process of the investigation
appear to have been structured with less skepticism than was needed to see through these particularly
complex transactions."); Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and
Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143 (2002).
12 See POWERS REPORT, supra note 11, at 4-5 (stating committee's conclusion that certain related-
party transactions lacked economic substance and were entered into solely for the purpose of manipulat-
ing Enron's financial statements).
13 See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Ver-
sus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1044 (2003) (distinguishing regulatory arbitrage from strategic non-
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lawyer would be required to prevent the kind of abuse that is colorfully il-
lustrated by a former Enron employee:
Say you have a dog, but you need to create a duck on the financial statements.
Fortunately, there are specific accounting rules for what constitutes a duck:
yellow feet, white covering, orange beak. So you take the dog and paint its
feet yellow and its fur white and you paste an orange plastic beak on its nose,
and then you say to your accountants, "This is a duck! Don't you agree that
it's a duck?" And the accountants say, "Yes, according to the rules, this is a
duck." Everybody knows that it is a dog, not a duck, but that does not matter,
because you have met the rules for calling it a duck.14
It is not surprising that the rules of financial accounting would have
criteria for duck-ness, but a point often escapes non-lawyers about the na-
ture of rule-based reasoning: no matter how clear a rule appears to be, it
will always be ambiguous enough to be manipulated. That is, unless the
rule is interpreted in light of non-textually bound interpretive conventions
and practices, applied through the informed judgment of a decisionmaker
rather than through the text itself.5 Professionalism, in a nutshell, instructs
lawyers not to participate in the hocus-pocus of turning dogs into ducks,
and is therefore a principle for regulating the exercise of interpretive judg-
ment.
Similarly, when several internal government memos came to light
which seemed to provide a blueprint for evading domestic and international
legal prohibitions on torture, two prominent commentators referred to them
as "standard lawyerly fare, routine stuff."' 6 This characterization, however,
begs the question of what attitude lawyers ought to take toward the law.
One of the memos counseled the government that mistreatment of prisoners
amounts to torture only under extremely unusual circumstances, and that
the abuse of prisoners may be justified by criminal law doctrines such as
self-defense and necessity. 7 This advice is far from "routine stuff," be-
compliance, and defining the latter as "action under an interpretation of the law in conflict with the
stated interpretation of the regulator").
14 BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE
AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 142-43 (2003) (quoting an unidentified former Enron employee).
15 See LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF
THE LAW ix-x (1996) (arguing that legal practice is pervaded by opportunities for "avoision," or clever
transactional structuring that straddles the line between legitimate penalty avoidance and illegitimate
evasion); Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate
Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1317 (2002) (claiming that due to the complexity of structured-
finance transactions, "Enron's investors ... must, to some extent, rely on the business judgment of En-
ron's management").
16 See Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, A "Torture" Memo and Its Tortuous Critics, WALL ST. J.,
July 6, 2004, at A22.
17 See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Coun-
sel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), available at The George Washington University National Security
Documents On-Line Archive, http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/index.htm (last
visited Dec. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Aug. I OLC Memo].
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cause it relied on a highly artificial--one might say "creative and aggres-
sive"-reading of the governing law. It is difficult to resist the temptation
to pun and call the reasoning "tortured," because it so clearly reveals the au-
thor's determination to come up with any argument, however plausible, that
the law against torture does not apply to detainees at Guantdnamo Bay. The
overwhelming reaction by experts in criminal, international, constitutional,
and military law has been that the legal analysis in the government memos
was so distorted that the lawyers' advice was incompetent. 8 Given that the
memos were prepared by agencies, such as the Office of Legal Counsel,
that traditionally employ some of the ablest lawyers in government, it is
unlikely that the authors lacked technical legal skills. The explanation for
the deficiencies in reasoning is more likely that the authors did not want to
regard the law as constraining their client's ends, so they approached the
law in an excessively adversarial stance, in effect adopting the attitude that
they would make the law say what they wanted it to say. Like the meta-
phorical process of turning dogs into ducks, this is an example of how law-
yers can violate the obligation of professionalism when interpreting the law
and counseling clients.
This Article belongs to a subgenre of legal ethics scholarship that ex-
amines the lawyer's responsibility as a law-interpreter and private law-giver
when representing clients in transactional and counseling matters. 9 To the
extent a lawyer is justified in taking an adversarial stance toward the law in
litigation, that justification depends on procedural checks to safeguard
against exploitation or misapplication of law. '0 A considerable degree of
18 See, e.g., Kathleen Clark & Julie Mertus, Torturing the Law, WASH. POST, June 20, 2004, at B3
(criticizing "stunning legal contortions" in memos); Adam Liptak, Legal Scholars Criticize Memos on
Torture, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2004, at A14 (quoting Harold Koh calling the memos "embarrassing" and
Cass Sunstein's opinion that the legal analysis was "very low level, . . .very weak, embarrassingly
weak, just short of reckless"); Ruth Wedgewood & R. James Woolsey, Law and Torture, WALL ST. J.,
June 28, 2004, at A10 (concluding that memos "bend and twist to avoid any legal restrictions" on torture
and ignore or misapply governing law). For an example of what can only be either blatant incompetence
or highly tendentious advocacy, consider that the torture memos' discussion of executive power in war-
time never even mentions, let along provides a persuasive distinction of, the steel seizure case, Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which is the leading Supreme Court decision on
separation of powers in this context.
19 For other examples, see Sanford Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything
at All?, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353 (1986); Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An
Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995).
20 The Model Code, which was frequently criticized for assimilating all lawyering activities to ad-
versarial litigation, actually recognizes quite plainly the importance of context. "Where the bounds of
law are uncertain, the action of a lawyer may depend on whether he is serving as advocate or adviser."
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 (1981). Taking a narrow, technical, or instrumental
attitude toward the law is appropriate only (if at all) in adversarial litigation, and only where the lawyer
has a good faith belief that her interpretation of the law is supported by existing norms or by a reason-
able argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Id. at EC 7-4. In adversarial liti-
gation, this highly partisan stance toward the law may be justified by the effect on the tribunal of
opposing partisan presentations: "[T]he advocate, by his zealous preparation and presentation of facts
and law, enables the tribunal to come to the hearing with an open and neutral mind and to render impar-
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impartiality in the proceedings as a whole is insured by three factors: the
opposing lawyer's brief, the judge's experience (and the diligence of law
clerks), and the requirement that lawyers disclose adverse authority and not
make material misstatements of law.2' When the lawyer represents a client
outside the litigation context, however, these procedural constraints on par-
tisanship are absent. In counseling and transactional representation, the
only constraint on the assistance the lawyer may provide to the client is
provided by the law itself, as interpreted by the lawyer on whose client the
law is expected to act as a constraint.22 Thus, a lawyer may be tempted to
apply the law as the client wishes it to be, as distinct from as it actually is.
As I will argue, this problem cannot be avoided by clarifying the law, be-
cause part of the nature of language is its inability to capture the full range
of meaning that a text must bear. In other words, there is no such thing as a
self-interpreting legal text that regulates the actions of lawyers or clients
apart from the exercise of interpretive judgment by a community of profes-
sionals. As a consequence, the law cannot operate as a device to settle
normative conflict and coordinate activity without a commitment on the
part of law-interpreters to respect the substantive meaning standing behind
the formal expression of legal norms.23
Part II of this Article begins the argument for professionalism by criti-
cally examining the prevailing wisdom of many scholars and practicing
lawyers, which can be labeled legal realism, law-as-price, or the Holmesian
bad man view of law. The position I criticize essentially permits the lawyer
to assist the client in planning around the law without regard to the possibil-
ity that a legal restriction ought to be interpreted as a legitimate restriction
on the client's activities. By "legitimate" I mean that the law has normative
significance as such in the client's practical deliberations (conducted
through the means of a lawyer, naturally, if the law is too complex to be
understood without legal training and experience). The view I criticize
tial judgments." Id. at EC 7-19. The attorney as adviser, however, is bound to render a professional
opinion as to the applicability of law, interpreted from the point of view of an impartial tribunal. Id. at
EC 7-5. The modem law governing lawyers preserves these distinctions. Compare MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2002) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] (stating that an attorney as adviser must use
independent professional judgment and render candid advice), with id. R. 3.1 (stating that a lawyer rep-
resenting client in litigated matter may assert any nonfrivolous legal argument).
21 For the duty of candor to the tribunal, see MODEL RULES, supra note 20, R. 3.3(a)(1) (stating that
a lawyer may not make material misstatements of fact or law to the tribunal), and id. R. 3.3(a)(2) (stating
that a lawyer may not fail to disclose to the tribunal controlling adverse legal authority).22 Pepper, supra note 19, at 1549, 1566-67.
23 Although superficially this requirement may seem objectionable, because it requires the lawyer
to imagine herself in the position of a judge, the law governing lawyers actually does require lawyers to
adopt this interpretive stance when advising clients. See MODEL RULES, supra note 20, R. 2.1. This rule
requires lawyers to exercise "independent professional judgment" and render "candid advice," which
means that the lawyer must provide advice from a standpoint that is independent of the client's interests.
As the comments to the rule recognize, this advice may be unpleasant for the client to hear, but lawyers
are nevertheless professionally obligated to deliver bad news in the appropriate circumstances. See id.
R. 2.1 cmt. 1.
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would regard the law as functioning in practical reasoning as only one cost
among many, and not as the expression of a view that individuals should, or
should not do something. The jurisprudential problem with that position is
that it undermines the social function of law, which is to establish settle-
ment and coordination in a broad sense.
The terms settlement and coordination are familiar in the legal theory
literature,24 but I use them slightly idiosyncratically to mean a more robust
or substantively meaningful resolution of a normative conflict. Suppose
there is disagreement about an important public policy issue, such as
whether a certain type of corporate transaction must be fully disclosed in a
company's financial statements or, even, whether some humiliating and de-
grading interrogation techniques should be allowed when questioning sus-
pected terrorists. If this disagreement cannot be settled by deliberation and
debate, people turn to the law for resolution, in order to enable them to co-
operate on common projects without becoming mired in the same norma-
tive dispute. It is critical to this settlement process that the law be
interpreted as having a substantive meaning that depends in part on legal
texts, but which is not exhausted by texts. If the form alone of an enacted
law determined its meaning for the purposes of constraining lawyers' inter-
pretive activities, then it would be practically impossible to achieve settle-
ment, because given sufficient cleverness and resources, lawyers can almost
always structure their clients' activities around purely formal rules. Using
the law to achieve settlement, and therefore the possibility of mutually
beneficial social interactions, requires that lawyers approach the law with
the intent to recover the meaning of the law, rather than simply to manipu-
late formal features of legal texts. Thus, Part II will continue by consider-
ing a simple example of how different interpretive stances or attitudes can
yield different meanings for legal texts.
The straightforward statute in Part II will serve as an analogy for the
exponentially more complex schemes of regulation applicable to the practi-
cal contexts we will consider in Part III, namely the problem of identifying
tax shelters, the abuse of legal and accounting rules by Enron, and the at-
tempt by the Bush administration to avoid legal restrictions on torture. This
Part also takes up in more detail the arguments against textualist theories of
24 See infra note 53 and accompanying text. The term "coordination problem" has a technical, nar-
rower use in game theory. Coordination games are those in which the interests of the players do not
conflict (in contrast to prisoners' dilemma games), but where the games have more than one Nash equi-
librium. The parties are jointly better off adopting one of the equilibrium strategies, but in the absence
of a means to communicate their strategy, the parties may not reach the beneficial equilibrium result.
See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 36-42 (1994). I use the term coordina-
tion problem in a different sense, but one which is common in jurisprudence. "[A] coordination problem
is any cost that results from moral disagreement or from uncertainty about how others will resolve ques-
tions about what they are morally permitted, required, or forbidden to do." Larry Alexander, "With Me,
It's All Er Nuthin"': Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 530, 534 (1999). The cost
associated with moral disagreement is simply the inability of disputants to move beyond argument and
reason-giving, into action that is socially permitted.
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interpretation. Although I argue against textualism, it is important to em-
phasize that this Article is located firmly within the positivist tradition, in
particular the incorporationist strand associated with Professor H.L.A. Hart.
The interpretive attitude that professionalism requires lawyers to take to-
ward the law is not a demand of ethics considered apart from the law.
Rather, it is part of the law in the sense that lawyers and judges employ it to
determine what the law actually is, as opposed to what it should be. In
jurisprudential terms, the rule of recognition of the American legal system
incorporates non-textual sources, including interpretive principles that dif-
ferentiate between legitimate and abusive applications of rules. The in-
strumental stance toward law is actually ruled out by the interpretive
practices of courts and lawyers, but in addition, one could make a norma-
tive argument based on the settlement and coordination function of law.
The settlement achieved by law is not merely a form of words that estab-
lishes some minimal logical constraint on the range of possible meanings
that can be ascribed to the utterance. Rather, it is a substantive response to
a normative conflict, which functions in practical reasoning by displacing
the reasons that would otherwise count in favor of a contrary action. Thus,
to the extent individuals and lawyers share the need to resolve conflict and
work together on common projects, they have a sufficient moral reason to
respect the meaning of legal norms.
Part III concludes with the application of this theory of legal ethics to
the cases of tax shelters, special-purpose entity transactions in Enron, and
the Justice Department's memos on the domestic and international law of
torture. In each of these cases, the governing legal texts are consistent with
a formal interpretation, in which the client is permitted to do something,
and a substantive interpretation, in which the client's acts would be prohib-
ited. Although lawyers in all three cases have attempted to justify the for-
mally plausible result, their interpretations would not be accepted in a
community of lawyers and judges who are motivated to ascertain the actual
meaning of the governing legal standards. Indeed, the only reason the law-
yers in all of these cases may have been comfortable arguing for the for-
mally plausible interpretation is that they expected some degree of secrecy,
either through the audit lottery (in the case of tax shelters), the cover pro-
vided by byzantine transactions and obfuscated disclosures (the Enron ma-
nipulations), or geographic isolation and covert activities (the interrogations
at Guantdnamo Bay and Abu Ghraib). The correlation between a lack of
transparency and aggressively instrumental interpretations of law suggests
that the public justifiability of a legal interpretation is a significant compo-
nent of its legitimacy. The veil of secrecy having been stripped from these
interpretations, we can criticize the lawyers not in first-order moral terms,
but for having misapplied and distorted the law governing their clients'
conduct.
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II. PROFESSIONALISM VS. THE HOLMESIAN BAD MAN STANCE
The principal target of my argument is the position that lawyers are
permitted to take a "Holmesian bad man" interpretive attitude toward legal
norms, regarding them as obstacles to be planned around, or even costs to
be incurred in the course of pursuing the projects of one's clients. 5 Oliver
Wendell Holmes defined the content of the law in terms of a prediction
about how legal officials might decide particular cases, which he illustrated
through the metaphor of a "bad man" who is interested only in avoiding le-
gal penalties that might attach to his conduct. The problem with the per-
spective of the bad man is not that it is descriptively inaccurate-surely
many people, including lawyers, do care about the law only insofar as it
might impose sanctions on them-but that it is jurisprudentially unsatisfy-
ing. The bad man's perspective is only one of many standpoints that one
may adopt toward the law,26 and it is far from self-evident that it is the best
perspective to employ when describing the relationship between lawyers
and the law. The choice of an interpretive standpoint is a normative one,
and there must be an argument for why one ought to adopt the perspective
of the bad man if that perspective is to do any justifying work in jurispru-
dence. As Ronald Dworkin rightly observes, a participant in a social prac-
tice does not regard the practice and its constitutive rules as simply given,
but assumes it serves some interest or purpose.2" The focus of a theory of
lawyering must therefore be on the purpose of the legal system and, corre-
spondingly, the value of having officially licensed and regulated lawyers
who represent clients in matters requiring legal advice, judgment, and
skill.2 The argument must be "normative all the way down," with a theory
25 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-62 (1897).
26 See William Twining, The Bad Man Revisited, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 275 (1973).
27 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 47 (1986). Dworkin uses the term "the interpretive attitude"
to describe the standpoint of participants in a practice who seek to impose some meaning on the practice,
and to see it in its best light. Id. at 46-48. In this Article I will make a more general reference to plural
interpretive aitudes, which need not be identical with Dworkin's constructive interpretation theory of
law. I believe Dworkin is right in taking seriously the perspective of participants in a social practice, or
those who take what Hart calls an internal point of view toward the rules of a practice. See H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 56, 88-91 (2d ed. 1994). Dworkin's use of the singular term "interpretive
attitude" is too strong, however, because people governed by the rules of certain complex social prac-
tices may be able to adopt one of several reasonable stances toward the rules-e.g., attitudes of resis-
tance, cautious acquiescence, enthusiastic embrace, and so on. The attitude one takes toward the rules is
a significant jurisprudential question, and because I disagree with some aspects of Dworkin's theory of
law, it is important to note this terminological distinction.
28 Cf Joseph Raz, The Problem About the Nature of Law, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:
ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 179, 184-87, 192-93 (1994) (arguing against taking a
narrow "lawyer's perspective," which eliminates consideration of the lawyer's relationship with other
institutions such as courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and various intermediate associations);
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REv. 885 (2003)(recommending that theories of interpretation take into account the institutional competence of the inter-
preter).
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of democracy justifying a theory of the function of law, which in turn justi-
fies a conception of the lawyer's role.
Lawyers facing serious criticism from regulators or academics for their
roles in client malfeasance usually defend themselves and their extremely
narrow interpretive attitude by appealing to the lawyer-client relationship
and their duties as fiduciaries of clients. Their duties, say lawyers, are lim-
ited to protecting client interests by providing competent representation and
keeping secrets, and most certainly do not include serving as a gatekeeper
or quasi-regulator of their clients' transactions. 29  This defense misses the
point, however, that the lawyer-client relationship is itself created by the le-
gal system and imposes duties on lawyers to the extent (and only to the ex-
tent) those duties are justified by the social function of the law. Lawyers
are not judges, who are institutionally charged with the task of remaining
impartial, but they are also not clients, who may be permitted to approach
the law from a partisan and self-interested perspective. The role of lawyer
is something of an amalgam of the judges' and clients' roles, serving as a
bridge between the biased position of the client and the ideally neutral posi-
tion of the judge.3"
29 See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n, Statement of Policy Adopted by the American Bar Association Regard-
ing Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers in Advising with Respect to the Compliance by Clients
with Laws Administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 31 Bus. LAW. 543 (1975); James
A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization "Officer of the Court," 48 BUFF. L.
REV. 349 (2000); Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1281 (2003); Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future En-
rons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097 (2003); Lawrence J. Fox, The Fallout from Enron: Media Frenzy and
Misguided Notions of Public Relations Are No Reason to Abandon Our Commitment to Our Clients,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1243, 1243-59. For example, the joint submission of numerous large law firms
argued as follows:
An attorney to an issuer.., is ethically bound to act as a legal counselor to, and at times an advo-
cate for, that issuer, is not independent or required to be, and only in very limited circumstances
provides advice that may be relied on by the investing public.
Letter from 79 Law Firms to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission 2 (Apr.
7. 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/79lawfirmsl.htm. Harry Reasoner, the
managing partner of Vinson & Elkins, one of Enron's principal outside law firms, defended his firm's
conduct in similar terms, punting responsibility for ensuring that transactions had economic substance to
Enron's accountants. "There is a misunderstanding of what outside counsel's role is," he said. "We
would have no role in determining whether, or what, accounting treatment was appropriate." John
Schwartz, Enron's Many Strands: The Lawyers: Troubling Questions Ahead for Enron's Law Firm,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002, at C1. For a thorough analysis of the tension between competing concep-
tions of the lawyers role which came to a head over the National Student Marketing case, see Simon
Lome, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, The Public Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L.
REV. 423 (1978).
30 Robert W. Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law: Fantasies and Practices of New York
City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51
(Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984). This hybrid role has long been accepted as a description of the duties of
a prosecutor. See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a
Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695 (2000).
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Lawyers are fiduciaries, but not only caretakers of their clients' inter-
ests-they are also custodians of the law in an important sense." Thus,
they have a responsibility to build the interests of third parties into their in-
terpretation of law, even when working on behalf of private clients. This is
not to say that lawyers have a responsibility toward something amorphous
like "the public interest"-indeed, disagreement about the nature of the
public interest is precisely what makes law necessary in the first place.32
Rather, the lawyer's responsibility is toward the law, and to what it repre-
sents as a mechanism to coordinate social activity through private ordering
(as opposed to active intervention by state officials), despite deep and per-
sistent normative disagreement. Although lawyers usually become almost
apoplectic at the suggestion that they have any responsibility toward the le-
gal system or the law as such, it is impossible to justify allowing lawyers to
approach the law like Holmes's bad men under an institution-sensitive the-
ory of law and lawyering.
A. Rational Instrumentalism?
Contemporary defenders of the Holmesian bad man interpretive atti-
tude often identify with the law and economics movement.33 Of course, an
31 German law recognizes a similar duty on the part of a lawyer to serve as a custodian of the law-
ein Pfleger des Rechts. The foundation of the German judicial system is an obligation on the part of all
actors within the system, including lawyers, to take care of the law. Thus, a lawyer is referred to as ein
unabhdngiges Organ der Rechtspflege-an independent institution in the administration of justice. See
Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung, v. 5.8.2004 (BGBI. I S.565) (as last amended by art. 4 (18) of Zuletzt
geindert durch Gesetz zur Modemisierung des Kostenrechts (Kostenrechtsmodemisierungsgesetz), v.
5.5.2004 (BGBI. I S.718)). Thanks to Dennis Tuchler for pointing out this parallel and to Jens Damman
for the citation to the German lawyer-licensing statute.
32 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1293, 1294 (1987) (arguing that "an agency attorney acts unethically when she substitutes
her individual moral judgment for that of a political process which is generally accepted as legitimate").
33 See, e.g., the well-known argument of Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel:
[Mlanagers do not have an ethical duty to obey economic regulatory laws just because the laws ex-
ist. They must determine the importance of those laws. The penalties Congress names for disobe-
dience are a measure of how much it wants firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to the rules; the
idea of optimal sanctions is based on the supposition that managers not only may but also should
violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REv.
1155, 1177 n.57 (1982); see also Stephen MeG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge, Knowledge About Legal Sanc-
tions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 261 (1993) (assuming that the law is relevant to actors only insofar as it imposes
a cost on prohibited behavior). Cynthia Williams uses the term "law-as-price" conception to label this
interpretive attitude. See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Effi-
ciency, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1265, 1267 (1998). The law-as-price theory is somewhat different because it
expands the Holmesian bad man predictive orientation toward law into a distinctive theory of entitle-
ment. According to law-as-price, one has a right to violate the law which can be obtained simply by
"purchasing" the associated penalty, or willingly incurring a risk of the penalty. Id. at 1268. This dif-
ference is immaterial for the purposes of this Article, because both the Holmesian bad man predictive
account of law and the law-as-price theory of entitlement are predicated on the same jurisprudential er-
ror, which I will discuss in detail here.
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affinity for law and economics does not make one pro-Enron; indeed, so-
phisticated neoclassical economic theory may even support something like
the attitude of professionalism. As Kenneth Arrow points out, contracts,
markets, and transactions depend on relationships of trust and confidence.34
It is impossible to draft contracts with enough specificity to handle every
situation that could conceivably arise in the course of a commercial rela-
tionship. Thus, the parties depend on one another not to behave opportunis-
tically. "Every contract depends for its observance on a mass of
unspecified conditions which suggest that performance will be carried out
in good faith without insistence on sticking literally to its wording."35 In re-
lational contracting, the parties rely on the repeated nature of their interac-
tions to safeguard against opportunistic behavior.36 A similar dynamic
limits dishonesty in small communities where the participants may encoun-
ter one another in a future commercial relationship and where information
about misconduct can be inexpensively disseminated.37 In one-shot interac-
tions in larger and more impersonal communities, the parties must use a dif-
ferent mechanism to ensure against exploitation; in this case economic
theory uses the concept of lawyers as reputational intermediaries to explain
why a lawyer or law firm would avoid being too aggressive in structuring
transactions.
The services of gatekeepers, such as transactional lawyers and auditing
firms, signal to the market that the client's representations are fair and accu-
rate.3" Gatekeepers can perform this function because their principal stock
in trade is a reputation for probity, built up over years of "vouching" for cli-
ents by representing them in transactions. A gatekeeper firm would squan-
34 Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency, 21 PUB. POL'Y 303, 314
(1973).
35 Id.; see also Pepper, supra note 19, at 1553-54 (noting that it would become vastly more expen-
sive and cumbersome to regulate through law if lawyers took a Holmesian bad man stance toward the
law).
36 Stuart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 55 (1963).
37 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of
the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 115
(1992); David Chamy, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373
(1990).
38 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1293 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid, "
57 Bus. LAW. 1403 (2002); Coffee, supra note 4, at 279-97; Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey,
Was Arthur Andersen Different? An Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large
Clients, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263 (2004); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing
Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509
(1994); Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
YALE L.J. 239 (1984); Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); Reinier Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the
Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).
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der this reputation by vouching for a client whose representations were dis-
honest, so its association with a client is a credible signal of the client's
honesty. Because gatekeepers have less to gain from dishonesty than cli-
ents do, they have a powerful incentive to monitor the client's conduct for
dishonesty, to avoid losing valuable credibility. In effect the gatekeeper be-
comes a quasi-regulator, ensuring that deals are reached on the basis of ac-
curate information.
Nevertheless, the relational-contracting and gatekeeper ideas still con-
cede something significant to the Holmesian bad man model, namely their
bleak vision of professionals as essentially self-interested, amorally prag-
matic actors who take a purely instrumental approach to the law. 9 In the
economic vision of professional ethics, there is only one reason to follow
the law or to be honest in contractual relationships: fear of sanctions.4"
Sanctions may come in the form of official, state-imposed punishments or
non-legal penalties such as the loss of business opportunities. Regardless of
form, the avoidance of sanctions is the sole reason to refrain from exploit-
ing other parties in a transaction or from treating legal rules as inconven-
iences to be planned around. As Holmes so memorably put it, this attitude
toward the law "stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to
get as much ethics into the law as they can."'" His mocking tone shows his
disdain for anyone who regards the law as legitimate, and therefore a reason
for acting. Economic theory has no place for actors who are guided by le-
gal norms because they regard them as having moral force in their own
right.
But what would be the normative argument for taking a purely instru-
mental stance toward the law? It cannot be the observation that the world is
full of Holmesian bad men, which would be a simplistic version of G.E.
Moore's naturalistic fallacy.42 The most promising argument in favor of in-
39 See Brian Leiter, Holmes, Economics, and Classical Realism, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS
INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 285 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000).40 Cf Holmes, supra note 25, at 462 ("The duty to keep a contract at common law means a predic-
tion that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else."). The instrumental attitude
toward law may be characterized, in jurisprudential terms, as reducing conduct rules to decision rules.
See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97
HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). Rules are analytically separable into two categories: conduct rules, which
are addressed to individuals and which permit or forbid certain actions; and decision rules, which are
addressed to officials and regulate the act of passing judgment. Although these categories are conceptu-
ally distinct, it is possible to run them together in practice, and conceive of conduct rules as being en-
tirely a function of decision rules. See id. at 632. The Holmesian bad man attitude focuses
interpretation solely on decision rules-i.e., when will a judge determine that I have violated the law?
The attitude prescribed by professionalism focuses interpretation on conduct rules-i.e., what does the
law require?
41 Holmes, supra note 25, at 462.
42 G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 13 (1903). The naturalistic fallacy in ethics is the reduction of
propositions of ethics (e.g., "you ought to do X") to observations about what people actually do ("people
do X") or what they believe with respect to what they should do ("people think it is good to do X"). The
problem is that reduction to propositions about the natural world seems to squeeze the normativity out of
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strumentalism relies on libertarian premises-the fundamental moral sig-
nificance of human freedom, and the concomitant requirements that any re-
strictions on liberty imposed by the state be justified by reasons shared by
the object of coercion, general, knowable in advance of acting, and no
broader than necessary to accomplish their purpose. Indeed, a deep insight
of modem legal ethics theory, characteristic of the work of William Simon
and Robert Gordon, is the extent to which the prevailing attitudes of prac-
ticing lawyers toward the law reflect the assumption that the purpose of the
legal system is to delineate a sphere of individual autonomy which is pro-
tected against interference by other individuals or the state.43 But Simon
and Gordon have not only recognized that this foundation is unsound-
they, along with David Luban and others, have completely demolished it."
In brief, they argue the following. First, the autonomy of the client is not
some kind of moral trump card over the lawyer's own moral agency, which
would require reasoning about the permissibility of the client's ends quite
apart from considerations of the client's autonomy. Second, citizens are not
entitled to autonomy as such, but only to a just measure of autonomy that is
compatible with the rights of others. Third, liberty is only one value among
others that a decent legal system would seek to protect. Fourth, lawyers
participate to such a great extent in interpreting and applying the law that
legal restrictions on client autonomy can hardly be said to be impartial and
general. And finally, even if autonomy were the most important thing, its
exercise depends on a stable framework of legal norms and institutions,
which is undercut by instrumentalist approaches to the law.
The other principal argument for taking an instrumental stance toward
the law mistakenly overgeneralizes from the paradigm of adversarial litiga-
tion.45 The most shopworn aphorism in legal ethics is that a lawyer's pri-
ethical propositions, because ethical activities like valuing are different from observing, describing, and
other scientific activities. Moore expressed this concern with his famous "open question" argument. If
one says, "X is good because it produces happiness," it is always an open question why one ought to
produce happiness. One major challenge in ethics is to avoid the naturalistic fallacy without an infla-
tionary metaphysics that relies on entities like Moore's supersensory quality of goodness. See generally
HILARY PUTNAM, ETHICS WITHOUT ONTOLOGY (2004).
43 See WILLIAM SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 30-37 (1998) (calling this the "Libertarian
Premise"); Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can't Just Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE:
LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 42, 47 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000) (describ-
ing "libertarian-positivist view"). For the best known defense of the minimal state, grounded in the
value of autonomy, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
44 See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 167-69 (1988); David Luban, The Lysistratian Pre-
rogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637.
45 See BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 201.2, at 43-44 (3d ed. 1995)
(arguing that filing a tax return should not be analogized to an adversarial proceeding); William H.
Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion
and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243 (1998) (noting the litigation mindset that spilled over into
the representation of Charles Keating in a regulatory matter, which caused the law firm to take an inap-
propriately adversarial stance toward government regulators).
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mary duty is to "represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."46
Lawyers who seize on this maxim as a justification for interpreting the law
as Holmesian bad men often elide the distinction between acting as an ad-
vocate in litigation and acting as a counselor or transactional engineer. Ask
a securities lawyer why she opposes a requirement to report out evidence of
client fraud, and she is likely to mention the principle of zealous representa-
tion, seemingly unaware that this phrase, as originally stated in the Model
Code, applied only to representation in litigation. For good reason, how-
ever, a lawyer's attitude toward the law must vary according to the context
in which she is representing a client.
A well prepared adversary and a fully informed tribunal are institu-
tional features that counter excessive adversarial zeal in litigation and en-
sure that legal norms are applied in an impartial manner. In litigation, the
judge serves as the custodian of the law, and as long as she is adequately in-
formed and not misled, the parties' lawyers are justified in leaving to the
judge the responsibility for taking care of the law. But transactional
lawyering lacks the essential elements of litigation: an impartial referee,
orderly procedures, rules for obtaining, introducing, and excluding evi-
dence, and a competent opposing party. It is so different from adversarial
litigation that one wonders why anyone has ever thought to analogize the
role of lawyer from one context to the other.47 Whatever psychological en-
thusiasm a lawyer might feel for her client's cause, the kind of zealous rep-
resentation a lawyer may provide in counseling and transactional practice is
circumscribed by a heightened obligation not to treat the law instrumen-
tally. In effect, the legal system has delegated the judge's caretaker func-
tion to the lawyer in cases where the lawyer's interpretation of the law is
not subject to review by an impartial referee.
The arguments in this Article are an attempt to provide a secure juris-
prudential foundation for this "caretaker" theory of the authority of law and
of legal interpretation-a model of lawyering which treats legal norms le-
gitimately, as reasons in themselves that bear on a lawyer's practical delib-
eration.48 In this view, legal rules are not only legitimate reasons for action
but preclude recourse to ordinary first-order moral reasons, including the
value of client autonomy. Legal norms preempt other reasoning because
the law itself arises from recognition of deep and persistent disagreement,
resulting from a plurality of worthwhile human goods, values and forms of
life, empirical uncertainty, divergent evaluative standpoints, and what
Hume called the circumstances of justice-moderate scarcity and limited
benevolence.49 Many goods, such as health care, education, and the protec-
46 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980).
47 See LUBAN, supra note 44, at 56-66.
48 See Wendel, supra note 6, at 364. The summary here is extremely abbreviated, and many details
of the position are explained in the prior Article.
49 See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM 5-6, 28-35 (2002); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS
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tion of safety and property, can be realized only by cooperation with others,
so every person has an interest in working together with other members of
the society in order to satisfy her desires for these goods .5  At the same
time, people disagree with one another, either about the best way to obtain
basic goods (means-ends rational disagreements), constraints that should be
placed on others' efforts to satisfy their desires (disagreements about
rights); or even fundamental disagreements about whether people should be
permitted to live particular kinds of lives (substantive disagreements about
goods).5 1 These conditions mean that much normative disagreement is in
good faith; people are not simply maneuvering in the public domain to grab
the biggest piece of the pie for themselves (although of course this hap-
pens), but are often motivated by the belief that their proposed rules for so-
cial ordering are those most likely to maximize social well being. 2
In many cases, parties to the normative disagreement share a desire for
an at least provisional settlement of the issue, enabling coordinated activity
notwithstanding the intractable dispute. "Settlement" here means not only
termination of the dispute, but taking a position on the normative issue that
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 21-23 (1996); STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND
EXPERIENCE 30-33 (1989); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 6-11 (2d ed. 1984); THOMAS
NAGEL, The Fragmentation of Value, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 128-41 (1979); NICHOLAS RESCHER,
PLURALISM: AGAINST THE DEMAND FOR CONSENSUS 76-78 (1993); WALDRON, supra note 9, at 175-
79; Isaiah Berlin, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 1 (1990); Morgan &
Tuttle, supra note 7.
50 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 149, 154-56, 231-33, 248-51 (1980). 1 do
not take a position as to whether the basic aspects of human well-being are those postulated by Finnis.
See id. at 85-90. It would be possible to generate a somewhat different list by emphasizing basic human
capabilities, as opposed to goods, for example. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
39-42 (1999); see also Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT
353-69 (1982) (arguing that basic human capabilities, rather than basic social goods, ought to be used as
the basis of the measurement of welfare). It is interesting that many of the goods described by Finnis
overlap with the capabilities identified by Nussbaum-consider life, health, play, and practical reason,
for instance. Rather than focusing on marginal differences among lists of basic values or capabilities,
this account assumes that some set of goods is constitutive of human flourishing and that at least some
of those goods can be realized only in an organized society. It is worth emphasizing, though, that I am
not using "public goods" in the sense the term is used in economics-i.e., goods such as clean air or na-
tional defense from which it is impossible to exclude users-but in a broader sense, to stand for the
various sorts of good things in social life that cannot be accomplished by individuals acting alone.
51 I refer to this dual aspect of human nature, as sociability and disputatiousness, as the "Grotian
problematic," following J.B. Schneewind's treatment of Hugo Grotius. See J.B. SCHNEEWIND, THE
INVENTION OF AUTONOMY 70-73 & passim (1998).
52 LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE
DILEMMAS OF LAW 12 (2001) ("[T]he road to the nasty, brutish, and short lives of the Hobbesian state
of nature does not require people motivated solely by selfishness and predatory opportunism .... ).
Some political theorists specify as a constraint on permissible deliberation the requirement that partici-
pants in public debate "recogniz[e] that an opponent's position is based on moral principles about which
people may reasonably disagree ...." GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 49, at 82. One might also
make an empirical claim that people do in fact disagree in good faith. My point is somewhat different.
It is the conceptual claim that the reasons we have for disagreement are such that people could disagree
in good faith, although it is also possible for people to be merely spiteful and avaricious.
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is robust enough to serve as the basis for coordinated activity. If there were
a normative disagreement about, say, whether certain methods of interroga-
tion run afoul of laws prohibiting torture, government officials whose con-
duct is regulated need to ascertain not only the words of the relevant law,
but their meaning. They care about more than what the words say; they
want to know whether they will be allowed to use interrogation technique T
on detainee D. The parties turn to an impartial, third-party procedural
mechanism-the law-because they share the desire for peaceful coopera-
tion and settlement, but cannot reach agreement through deliberation and
debate alone. 3 Because the law permits them to do better at realizing their
interest in cooperation than they would on their own, and because it is
adopted through procedures that meet a threshold standard of fairness and
respect for the parties to the normative disputes, the law has authority in the
domain of the disagreement and precludes practical reasoning on the basis
of the reasons that were relevant to the underlying controversy. 4 This is es-
sentially the argument for the negative aspect of professionalism, which
preempts recourse to reasons that would otherwise require a different action
in the circumstances, where a legal norm is in force. The positive aspect of
professionalism flows from the same conception of the authority of law,
and requires lawyers to interpret legal norms in such a way that the law can
continue to perform its coordination and settlement functions.
Before working through the defense of this position in detail, it may be
helpful to take a preliminary look at some examples of how changes in an
interpretive attitude in turn alter judicial decisions or the advice given to
clients. As the examples should make clear, the approach to legal interpre-
tation that flows from this conception of legal ethics is different from other
methods of interpretation, particularly textualism." Legal texts alone can-
53 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 52, at 11-15; HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1-4 (Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extra-
judicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).
54 This conception of the authority of law is derived from Joseph Raz's normal justification thesis.
See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 53 (1986); Joseph Raz, Introduction to AUTHORITY I,
12-13 (Joseph Raz ed., 1990). It is substantially influenced by Jeremy Waldron's use of the Razian
normal justification thesis ("NJT"). See WALDRON, supra note 9, at 95-96. Both are discussed in con-
siderably more detail in Wendel, supra note 6. I am making stronger claims for the force of the N1T
than Raz would accept, but I believe they are consistent with Waldron's expansive use of Raz's concep-
tion of authority.
55 For some of the most important contributions to this debate, see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); Frank H. Easterbrook, Stat-
utes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in
Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpre-
tation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Prac-
tical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992) [hereinafter
Farber, Inevitability]; John Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L.
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not achieve the settlement that is the function of law because they are never
self-interpreting. Indeed, a pervasive textualist style of interpretation may
be positively correlated with abusive interpretations of law that create costly
externalities. 56 Texts instead must be interpreted in light of interpretive un-
derstandings of the relevant community of lawyers and judges. The most
important features of professionalism as a style of interpretation are two-
fold: first, it avoids the policy preferences or first-order moral beliefs of in-
terpreters; and second, it resists manipulation of the form of legal norms to
defeat their substantive meaning. Professionalism, as defended here, does
not instruct lawyers to act in the public interest, which may be internally in-
coherent and normatively contested. Rather, it instructs lawyers to be
guided by what the public has come up with as its laws, through the process
of legislation, administrative rulemaking, and adjudication. Professional-
ism is grounded in fidelity to a society's laws, but it is critical that law not
be understood narrowly or formalistically. Rather, the law must be inter-
preted in a way that ensures it will continue to have the capacity to coordi-
nate social action against a background of persistent first-order normative
disagreement.
B. An Introductory Example: Text vs. Meaning
Professionalism makes reference to "substantive meanings" of legal
norms, as opposed to their mere formal expression. One natural objection
to this position is that legal norms do not have a substantive meaning apart
from their textual form. The following brief example of an ethical dilemma
in lawyering demonstrates that the meaning of even the simplest legal
norms-in this case a simple statute-depends on interpretive understand-
ings that are not captured in texts themselves. If a reader is persuaded in
this case that non-textual conventions and practices of legal reasoning are
actually relevant to determining the applicable law, then the only remaining
step in the argument for professionalism is to establish the wrongfulness of
ignoring them.
The Miserly Railroad. The Northern Atlantic Railroad asks its general
counsel whether it must make an expensive modification to its locomotives.
It is concerned that a new federal statute may mandate retrofitting the loco-
REV. 685 (1999); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1995); Frederick
Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV.
231; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989);
Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy
Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998).
56 See Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX. REV. 1
(2004) (observing correlation between increased incidence of abusive tax shelters and belief in textualist
styles of interpretation, prevalent among professional tax advisers).
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motives with an automatic coupling device.57 The relevant statutory lan-
guage reads:
On and after the first day of January, nineteen hundred and ninety-
eight, it shall be unlawful for any such common carrier to haul or per-
mit to be hauled or used on its line any car used in moving interstate
traffic not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact,
and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going be-
tween the ends of the cars.
The railroad's vice president of engineering tells the general counsel
that for technical reasons, it is much more difficult to equip locomotives, as
opposed to ordinary cars, with automatic coupling devices. She points out
that the statute requires automatic couplers on "cars," which in the ordinary
parlance of railroad workers would not be understood to include locomo-
tives. (She actually overheard a snippet of dialogue in which one employee
at a switching yard asked, "Are there any cars on that track?" and was told,
"Nope, just a locomotive.") Moreover, the examples used to illustrate the
definition of "car" in the Oxford English Dictionary all refer to convey-
ances that are pulled by a locomotive: passenger car, sleeping car, coal car,
freight car, and so on. Her argument is supported by the statute's use of the
verb "haul," of which "car" is an object-locomotives are not hauled; they
do the hauling. The general counsel also remembers reading in law school
a case involving the theft of an airplane, in which the Supreme Court noted
that the operative term "vehicle" did not "evoke in the common mind" the
image of an airplane. 8 What advice should the general counsel give to the
railroad regarding compliance with the statute?
In this case, the content of the law on point is facially uncertain, if law
is understood as a property of legal texts alone. The apparent uncertainty is
the result of linguistic ambiguity or vagueness (does the term "car" encom-
pass locomotives?). I suspect, however, that readers have already con-
cluded that this case does not actually involve any serious uncertainty and
that the railroad must equip the locomotives with automatic couplers.59
What justifies this conclusion? The answer to any question of legal inter-
pretation is ultimately provided by the conventions and practices of legal
reasoning, which form the basis for the exercise of informed, sound "situa-
tion sense," prudence, practical reasoning, or judgment. °
57 This problem is based on Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U.S. 1 (1904), rev'g 117 F. 462
(8th Cir. 1902), two casebook classics illustrating issues in statutory interpretation, but I freely embel-
lished many of the facts.
58 McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931) (interpreting a statute criminalizing "transporting
in interstate commerce a motor vehicle, knowing the same to have been stolen").
59 Cf. Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1567 (1985) (arguing that doctrinal, fac-
tual, and linguistic factors may make a particular outcome easy for competent lawyers to predict).
60 "Situation sense" is a term favored by Karl Llewellyn. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 60-61, 268-85 (1960). Anthony Kronman uses the Aristotelian
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Legal reasoning begins with the text of statutes and the holdings of
cases, but it does not end there. Indeed, a judge or lawyer might commit
the vice of "hypertextualism" by pretending that the language of a statute,
dictionary definitions, and rules of syntax are sufficiently determinate to
produce an objective interpretation of a text.6 Although the statute in the
railroad case uses the word "car," the legislature may have intended to re-
quire coupling devices on locomotives as well (perhaps after hearing testi-
mony about the frequency of locomotive-car coupling accidents), and only
a myopic fixation on the literal language of the statute would cause an in-
terpreter to miss this apparent meaning of the text. Moreover, statutory
language, definitions of words, canons of construction, and so on, might
create as much interpretive freedom as more expansive methods like pur-
posivism or intentionalism, thereby permitting the interpreter to impose her
own policy preferences on the text, under the guise of rendering an objec-
tive reading. Fortunately, in both of these styles of legal reasoning, there
are second-level principles that have developed in any given domain of law
that stabilize and regulate interpretation.62
The word "car" in isolation does inform whether the railroad is re-
quired to equip its locomotives with automatic couplers; if anything, it sug-
gests a counterintuitive negative response. Starting with the text of the
statute does tell us something; under this particular statute the railroad is not
terms "prudence" (as a translation ofphronesis) and "practical wisdom" to convey a similar notion. See
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993); Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Phi-
losophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. (1985). Modem commentators on statutory interpretation favor the
term "practical reason." See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 55; Farber, Inevitability, supra note
55; see also BURTON, supra note 7, at 6 n.9 (citing sources). One might even use the term "pragma-
tism," as popularized by Richard Posner, among others. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Pragmatic Adjudica-
tion, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM 235 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998). 1 will use the term judgment
throughout the Article, but it should be understood that I am appealing to this vigorous tradition of legal
theory, whatever label a particular writer chooses. And I intend as well to appeal (without elaboration,
because of the constraints of space and relevance) to the work of critics within moral philosophy who
seek to establish objective truths of ethics while making room for contextual judgment. See, e.g.,
PUTNAM, supra note 42.
61 Pierce, supra note 55, at 750-52.
62 See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988); Owen M. Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Pepper, supra note 19, at 1585-87 (sum-
marizing a series of factors and distinctions that define the bounds of the law). Owen Fiss refers to the
norms of an interpretive community as "disciplining rules," see Fiss, supra, at 744-45, but this impre-
cise use of the term "rules" has created unnecessary confusion, as is evident in Fiss's debate with
Stanley Fish. See Stanley Fish, Fish vs. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984). Fish makes an infinite re-
gress argument, noting that if these interpretive norms were indeed rules, they would stand in need of
interpretation, requiring further meta-disciplining-rules. See id. at 1326, 1334. Instead of rules, Fish
believes an interpretive community is constituted by "interpretive assumptions and procedures [that] are
so widely shared in a community that the rule appears to all in the same (interpreted) shape." Id. at
1327. Fiss's argument, read carefully, is that there are "interpretive assumptions and procedures" that
are widely shared within a community. Apparently Fiss actually does not disagree with Fish at all, and
Fish has simply seized on Fiss's use of the word "rule" to argue against a position that Fiss does not
hold.
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required to equip cars with air brakes, doors that can be opened from the in-
side, or some other useful safety feature. But the text still leaves interpre-
tive puzzles. What about the absence of the term "locomotive"? Congress
could easily have drafted the provision to read "any car or locomotive...
not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact." Under the
canon of construction known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius,63 an
interpreter should infer from the inclusion of the term "car" and the absence
of the term "locomotive" that Congress intended the statute not to apply to
locomotives. Of course, as Karl Llewellyn demonstrated in one of the best
known critiques of formalism, every canon of statutory construction has an
opposing canon, which should be used "when the context dictates."'  In this
case, if the context so dictates, one could argue that locomotives should be
included from the opposing canon that the statute may comprehend cases
beyond those specifically mentioned in the text, particularly if it is apparent
that the statute has a purpose (such as protecting the safety of railroad
workers) that would be advanced by requiring couplers on locomotives.65
Similarly, the lawyer might argue either that statutes in derogation of the
common law rule (which would not have required couplers on locomotives)
should be strictly construed, or that remedial statutes (which would require
the couplers) should be construed liberally to accomplish their purpose.66
And these are only principles of interpretation based on the language of a
statute.
There are also policy-based aids to construction, such as the rule of
lenity, which provides that an ambiguous criminal statute should be read
narrowly.6 7 The case mentioned by the railroad's vice president, involving
the theft of an airplane, can arguably be justified on this basis. Further-
63 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23, at 216-17 (5th ed.
1992). This was one of the arguments made by the court of appeals in this case. See Johnson v. S. Pac.
Co., 117 F. 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1902) ("This striking omission to express any intention to prohibit the use
of engines unequipped with automatic couplers raises the legal presumption that no such intention ex-
isted .... ).
64 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950). A notorious example of a
court disregarding the expressio unius canon is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S.
457, 458, 463 (1892), in which a statute making it a crime to assist "the importation or migration of any
alien" contained exceptions for certain categories of workers, such as lecturers, actors, and domestic
servants, but said nothing about "brain toilers" and "ministers of the gospel." The Court nevertheless
held the statute inapplicable to an elite New York City church which had arranged for the entry of its
new rector from England.
65 In reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court relied heavily on congressional intention and
the purpose of the statute. See Johnson v. S. Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1904).
66 The court of appeals opinion discusses these opposing canons. See Johnson, 117 F. at 464-65
("[C]ounsel for the plaintiff persuasively argues that this is a remedial statute.., and should be liberally
construed, to prevent the mischief and advance the remedy"); id. at 466 ("A statute which thus changes
the common law must be strictly construed.").
67 3 SINGER, supra note 59, § 59.03, at 102-05. The court of appeals also relied on the rule of len-
ity. Johnson, 117 F. at 467.
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more, we can ascribe a variety of hypothetical intentions to Congress (in the
absence of clear legislative history).68 Perhaps Congress wanted to improve
safety for railroad workers, even though it would impose high costs on the
railroads, in which case couplers should be required on locomotives. On
the other hand, the statute may have represented a compromise between
workplace-safety advocates and the railroad industry, in which case it fairly
should be read as requiring couplers only on non-locomotive cars.69
68 Interpretation by ascription of intention is a disfavored methodology in modem jurisprudence,
owing to powerful critiques by Dworkin and others. See DWORKIN, supra note 27, at 313-27; ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 29-32 (1997); WALDRON, supra note 9, at 124-29; Easter-
brook, supra note 55; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 55, at 325-32; Stephen F. Williams, Restoring
Context, Distorting Text: Legislative History and the Problem of Age, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1366
(1998). Briefly, the problems with imputing intentions to a multi-member representative body are that
there is no speaker or actor to whom to ascribe an actual unitary intention, and that constructing a fic-
tional unitary intention by combining the intentions of individual legislators is doomed to failure be-
cause of theoretical difficulties involved in identifying and cumulating the mental states of dozens, if not
hundreds of legislators. Each legislator may have had a variety of mental states with respect to the pro-
posed legislation--enthusiastic support, cautious assent, isolated qualms, serious reservations, or utter
indifference. Legislators also may be moved by motives of rent-seeking, party loyalty, or logrolling,
without regard to the content of the provision under consideration. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991). Specifically with respect to intention regarding interpreta-
tion, a legislator may hope that an interpreter would read the text in a particular way, even though she
fully expected a different interpretation to gain acceptance. Even if we could identify the intentions of
individuals, the actual text voted on by the majority may represent the intention of none of the individu-
als, because of the way preferences are registered in an assembly. Attempting to divine collective inten-
tion from legislative history is no less problematic, because of the malleability of legislative history and
the multiplicity of interpretations that can be supported by the relevant history documents such as com-
mittee reports and remarks made on the floor by supporters and opponents of the bill. Interpreting stat-
utes by selecting bits and pieces of legislative history has often been criticized as tantamount to "looking
over a crowd and picking out your friends." Patricia Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983); see also Conroy v.
Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). For an attempt to restore some jurispruden-
tial significance to the lawmaker's intent, see ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 52, at 98-117.
69 For a sophisticated discussion of the effect on interpretation of the lawmakers' and enforcement
officials' understanding of the remedial purpose of a statute, see Pepper, supra note 19, at 1570-71. The
scheme which limited couplers to non-locomotive cars might be an example of what Dworkin would
call a "checkerboard" statute, which seems to resolve the dispute in an arbitrary or unprincipled way.
See DWORKIN, supra note 27, at 178-84. Dworkin believes he is tapping into a generally shared intui-
tion that checkerboard statutes are objectionable because we would prefer ex ante that our preferred le-
gal norm be either adopted or rejected, but not compromised. "Even if I thought strict liability for
accidents wrong in principle, I would prefer that manufacturers of both washing machines and automo-
biles be held to that standard than that only one of them be." Id. at 182. But leaving aside obvious
checkerboards like a statute that made abortion legal on Mondays but illegal on Tuesdays, it is not clear
that all legislative compromises like Dworkin's products liability statute are unprincipled. There may be
good reasons for imposing strict liability on automobile manufacturers but not washing machine manu-
facturers. (Perhaps washing machines are easier for users to inspect for defects, or the expected cost of
accidents is not as high, as compared with automobiles.) In the railroad case, if for some reason it is
significantly more expensive to install couplers on locomotives, or if the operation of automatic couplers
on locomotives creates some new danger that would not be present if they were used only on non-
locomotive cars, the exclusion of locomotives from the coupler requirement would not be a checker-
board statute in Dworkin's sense.
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As in most legal cases, it is possible to argue both positions in the rail-
road case. This is the point at which analysis of statutory interpretation of-
ten resorts to metaphors of weighing and balancing to capture the process of
exercising judgment. The trouble with these tropes is that the process of
comparison they suggest creates an illusion of precision which in turn en-
courages unrealistic expectations about the objectivity of judging. To put it
another way, judgment sometimes functions as a black box in legal the-
ory-one result or another mysteriously pops out of the decisionmaking
machinery, but the process itself is opaque to third-party observation and
criticism. Sophisticated legal theorists do not use judgment in this way,
however. In every serious account of legal interpretation, the interpreter'sjudgment must be transparent-that is, available for public observation and
criticism. Requiring the interpreter to justify her judgment to the public de-
fends the judgment's objectivity against the critique that the interpreter is
simply imposing her own policy preferences on the law.
For example, Ronald Dworkin is the most enthusiastic proponent of a
thoroughgoing interpretive approach to law, and he is quite clear that his
hypothetical interpreter, the superhuman judge Hercules, must exercisejudgment with respect to an external standard. Hercules' standard is the
best justification of a legal speech-act (a judicial decision or the enactment
of a statute) where "best" is understood in terms of the coherence of the
principles underlying the act (i.e., as reasons explaining and justifying the
act) with a political community's ideals of integrity, fairness, and political
due process."0 Dworkin refers to this external constraint as integrity, and of-
fers integrity as a criterion for others to judge whether Hercules has exer-
cised his judgment correctly. Other theorists construct a framework of
criteria, rebuttable presumptions, or a continuum of complementary inter-
pretive methodologies.7 ' However these external checks on interpretive
discretion are constructed, they are essential to guard against both rampant
subjectivity by the interpreter, and ex post evaluations of the propriety of an
interpretation that would not have been as clear ex ante."
To these models of judgment I would add a critical jurisprudential
element: interpretation is not a function of a single judicial or lawyerly
70 DWORKIN, supra note 27, at 337-38, 345-46.
71 See Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1496-97 (proposing continuum in which text controls where it
provides determinate answers, but history, social and legal context, and evolutive context assume more
importance as textualist interpretations become more contestable); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 55, at
352-53 (proposing "funnel of abstraction" in which interpreter begins with statutory text and tests po-
tential interpretations for historical accuracy and conformity to contemporary circumstances and values);
Pepper, supra note 19, at 1607-09 (relying on moral perception and character to constrain the exercise
ofjudgment).
72 Cf Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1313 (suggesting that some of the decisions of accountants and
lawyers in the Enron transactions may look bad ex post, but at the time were defensible exercises of dis-
cretionary judgment).
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mind, acting alone.73 Rather, it is a community-bound enterprise, in which
the criteria for reasonable exercise of judgment are elaborated intersubjec-
tively, among an interpretive community that is constituted by fidelity to
law. These criteria are available to provide a justification of a decision.74
As Anthony Kronman correctly points out, a person characterized by good
judgment "is not someone who from time to time merely makes certain
strikingly appropriate oracular pronouncements." 5  Rather, a person of
good judgment can, if called upon to do so, provide a reasoned explanation
of her decision. 76  This explanation is a public phenomenon, in the sense
that the interpreter is appealing to shared community standards for evaluat-
ing the appropriateness of interpretation. In this way, the interpreter's dis-
cretion is constrained by public norms regulating the understanding of legal
texts.77 The meaning of these texts therefore becomes a property of the
73 Gerald Postema, "Protestant " Interpretation and Social Practices, 6 LAW & PHIL. 283 (1987).
74 See BURTON, supra note 7, at 19-22 (arguing that the rule of law demands that judges be able to
justify their decisions on the basis of reasons about what the law is, as opposed to what they think it
should be); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 205 (1973) (discuss-
ing Llewellyn's arguments in The Common Law Tradition).
75 Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 849 (1987).
76 HART & SACKS, supra note 53, at 143. 1 do not take a position on whether professionals con-
sciously rely on these criteria when exercising judgment. One influential account of professional judg-
ment emphasizes the extent to which this knowledge is tacit, although it can be given structure through
reflection. See DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS THINK IN
ACTION (1983). Others have pointed to research showing that if it is possible to specify criteria for the
exercise of judgment, one generally does better by following a mechanical decision procedure than by
committing the ultimate decision to the discretion of a professional. KATZ, supra note 15, at 14-16.
What matters for the purposes of this argument is that legal judgments can be objective to the extent
they are justified through publicly available reasons.
77 This observation is not limited to legal rules, but can be generalized to all linguistic assertions,
because language itself can never capture all of the shared understandings that are necessary to make
communication intelligible. Even the seemingly clearest possible assertion, such as "68 + 57 = 125,"
can be understood only in light of intersubjective assumptions about the permissible use of language.
SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982). In our community, the
"+" sign is understood to denote addition, but there is no reason, internal to the utterance "68 + 57 =
125," that the "+" sign could not denote "quaddition," that is, the operation "add the two quantities if
both are less than 57, otherwise return the value 5." This observation does not mean that "68 + 57 =
125" has no determinate meaning, only that its meaning is not a function solely of the symbols written
on the page, nor of other facts such as past usage of the "+" symbol, dispositions to use it in a certain
way, or intentions. The "quaddition" interpretation is ruled out only by interpretive understandings
shared by the community of language-users who wish to communicate with each other, which under-
standings are internalized and followed unconsciously by members of the community. It is nevertheless
the case that "68 + 57 = 125" is objectively true. But why cannot one argue that the community is actu-
ally engaging in "quinterpretation," which follows interpretive understandings that yield the true propo-
sition, "68 + 57 = 5"? Kripke's insight is that the principle of interpretation itself cannot announce that
it is not a principle of quinterpretation, and moreover there cannot be another meta-principle ruling out
quinterpretation within the legal system because that meta-principle itself must be interpreted.
To avoid an infinite regress, it is necessary to take a normative stance on interpretation that is rooted
in something external to the system of rules (or language, law, or anything else) that we are considering.
This pattern of argument leads to the conclusion, in jurisprudence, that legal texts themselves cannot
perfectly constrain interpretation in all cases. Nevertheless, the theory of law advanced here is still posi-
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community, which confers the ultimate authority on legal norms, and the
community's standards are legitimate to the extent they respect the purpose
of law, which is to enable people to live peacefully together, flourish, and
achieve their common ends.
A textualist might respond that I have assumed too hastily that judg-
ment is necessary. Perhaps the plain language of the statute provides suffi-
cient determinacy to accomplish the settlement of normative disputes that is
the function of law. One might also make the argument from the authority
of law by noting that legal norms are legitimate only to the extent they are
enacted by fair procedures, and in the case of legislation, fair procedures in-
volve a majority vote on a particular form of words embodied in the resolu-
tion under discussion.7" But the argument from authority shows only that
"the product of legislation" is entitled to respect, not that the product of leg-
islation is simply a text, the interpretation of which is confined to the literal
language of the enactment. Even Jeremy Waldron, who makes the argu-
ment from authority powerfully, concedes that "statutes need interpretation
[and] the words of the enactment (and their 'plain meaning') are often in-
sufficient to determine the statute's application."79 For Waldron, the impor-
tant thing is that the interpretive process begin with the sense that there is a
single, definitive proposal under discussion, and that the meaning of the
proposal should be recovered by beginning with the text of the enactment.
Suppose in the railroad case that the legislature had responded to a series of
lurid reports of accidents, and resulting public outcry. In the course of con-
sidering some response, it became apparent that workers were injured by at-
taching locomotives to cars as well as by hooking non-locomotive cars
together. The course of discussion in the legislature reveals that all mem-
bers of the assembly were concerned with this problem in toto, although the
members disagreed on other points, such as whether to make new safety
measures mandatory or voluntary."° In that instance, is there any doubt that
the word "car" should be interpreted to include locomotives? This interpre-
tation is not undermined by the reasons for treating the enactment as au-
thoritative, because the legislative response was aimed at settling some
disagreement other than a disagreement over whether the word "car" should
tivistic, because the law is capable of identification without resort to moral argumentation. For this
definition of positivism, see Jules Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, in MARKETS, MORALS
AND THE LAW 3, 4-5, 16 (1998). Dworkin resists the argument that a positivist theory can rely on a
norm that is accepted as part of a legal system because of "a sense of appropriateness developed in the
profession." RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14, 24 (1977).
But I follow Jules Coleman in believing that a rule of recognition may take account of interpretive con-
ventions or practices. See Jules Coleman, Authority and Reason, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS
ON LEGAL POSITIvISM 287 (Robert P. George ed., 1996); see also H.L.A. Hart, Postscript, in HART, su-
pra note 27, at 237, 241-42.
78 WALDRON, supra note 9, at 25, 77-82.
79 Id. at 79.
80 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 52, at 114-15 (arguing that the lawmaker's purposes
can provide context that makes interpretation determinate in some cases).
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include locomotives. Thus, one should not assume that the functional ar-
gument for the authority of law necessarily entails a textualist interpretive
methodology; in fact, it may support a broader purposivist approach to
statutory meaning.81
These higher-order norms regulating the exercise of judgment are le-
gitimate, and have authority to the exclusion of ordinary moral reasons, to
the extent they enable the law to fulfill its function of optimizing people's
ability to work together to achieve common projects.82 The law would fail
at this end if one of two conditions obtained: (1) it were impossible for a
representative of a client to discern the content of the law, or (2) it were
permissible for individual legal interpreters, such as lawyers, to manipulate
the formal expression of legal norms to make them mean anything at all.
Thus, returning to our examples, if it is apparent that the purpose of the
statute in the railroad case is to prevent accidents caused by workers getting
their hands caught in manual coupling mechanisms, there will be good
grounds for interpreting the statute to require automatic couplers on loco-
motives. Naturally, a contrary purpose may be apparent-perhaps, as sug-
gested previously, the statute was a compromise between advocates of a
comprehensive reform of railroad safety regulations and those who pre-
ferred a more cautious, incremental approach. In that case, one might make
a reasonable argument for not requiring the automatic couplers on locomo-
tives. But the crucial term here is "reasonable." The demand is, in any
event, for a reasoned elaboration of an interpretation of legal texts. Appeal-
ing only to formal features like the statutory text is not a reasoned elabora-
tion, absent some argument why the form alone ought to have dispositive
importance in the particular case.83
Finally, it is worth observing that judgment is also necessary in com-
mon-law reasoning because it is impossible fully to specify meta-rules that
capture the complexity of legal interpretation. The decisionmaker must
consider texts, principles, and facts, as well as subsidiary norms such as
81 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Circumstances of Politics and the Application of Statutes, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 558, 566 (2000) (reviewing WALDRON, supra note 9); Lawrence M. Solan, Private
Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 92 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2004) ("At the very least [legislative history] can help us to determine whether the diffi-
culty in applying the statute results from an unfortunate choice of statutory language to effectuate a leg-
islative goal that is very clear once one investigates the matter.").
82 HART & SACKS, supra note 53, at 146-48.
83 Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein makes a similar point in a different way, noting that for
utterances to be said to conform to a rule, they must not only conform to assertability conditions, but
also that there is some point, within the community of language-users, of making this type of utterance
under these conditions. See KRIPKE, supra note 77, at 92; see also BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE
OF MORAL JUDGMENT 83-84 (1993) (discussing rules of moral salience, which specify features of a
situation that are relevant to the exercise of moral judgment, and noting that not just any rules count as
rules of moral salience); Schauer, supra note 55, at 251 (asserting that members of linguistic communi-
ties not only share the ability to make sense of utterances, but do the same things with linguistic under-
standings).
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rules of legal salience (which point to aspects of the facts that are germane
to the decision), considerations of weight and priority among competing
norms, and the possibility of justified departures from previously sanc-
tioned interpretations. Consider a famous example of the interplay between
facts and rules in case interpretation, from Karl Llewellyn's Bramble Bush:
What are the facts? The plaintiff s name is Atkinson and the defendant's Wal-
pole. The defendant, despite his name, is an Italian by extraction, but the
plaintiff s ancestors came over with the Pilgrims. The defendant has a schnau-
zer-dog named Walter, red hair, and $30,000 worth of life insurance.... The
defendant's auto was a Buick painted pale magenta. He is married. His wife
was in the back seat, an irritable, somewhat faded blonde. She was attempting
back-seat driving when the accident occurred. He had turned around to make
objection. In the process the car swerved and hit the plaintiff. The sun was
shining; there was a rather lovely dappled sky low to the West. The time was
late October on a Tuesday. The road was smooth, concrete. It had been put in
by the McCarthy Road Work Company.84
It does not take more than a couple of weeks of law school for a first-
year student to learn to winnow out the relevant facts from an example like
this. But what has the student learned? Surely not a system of rules that
can be applied deductively (e.g., "if the dispute involves an auto accident,
road conditions may be relevant but not the plaintiff's ethnic ancestry"), be-
cause any set of rules would quickly become too complex to learn and ap-
ply. For example, the identity of the construction company may or may not
be legally salient, depending on whether the case involves allegations that
the design of the road contributed to poor visibility. Life insurance may
matter if this is a case in which the collateral source rule is an issue. Even
the ethnic background of the plaintiff and defendant might conceivably mat-
ter if the auto accident had been only the precursor to a violent argument in
which insults were exchanged, and out of which the plaintiff claims inflic-
tion of emotional distress.85 Some knowledge of the law is necessary to
know which facts are relevant, but the relevance-making relationship be-
tween law and facts is not constituted by rules.8 6 Instead of rule-application,
84 KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 48 (1951).
85 See, e.g., Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685 (N.J. 1998) (recognizing cause of action for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress arising out of racial epithets uttered in an employment setting).86 See Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REv. 280, 287-88 (1989) (ar-
guing that moral knowledge of the domain of consequentialist calculation is needed before it is possible
to proceed to consider consequences in moral reasoning); cf HERMAN, supra note 83, at 75 ("An agent
who came to the [Kantian Categorical Imperative] procedure with no knowledge of the moral character-
istics of actions would be very unlikely to describe his action in a morally appropriate way."). Note that
Moore does not subscribe to an intuitionist view, in which knowledge of the domain of consequentialist
calculation is something mysterious and ineffable; rather, he reviews numerous rigorous standards (such
as the act/omission and intended/foreseeable distinctions, the pre-existing peril doctrine, and Judith Jar-
vis Thomson's principle of redirecting harms) which justify the boundary between permissible and im-
permissible use of consequences in moral reasoning. Moore, supra, at 299-308. Moore boils these
down to the standard threefold analysis of criminal law culpability, id. at 308-09, but the application of
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this reasoning process involves the exercise of informed professional judg-
ment, which can be justified on the basis of rules and standards, but which
is always incompletely specified, or underdetermined by rules and stan-
dards. Lawyers acquire and internalize these higher-order norms through
professional education, and follow them largely unconsciously within a
given interpretive community.
C. Hard Cases and Right Answers
Building on this last point, and to anticipate a common objection to this
line of reasoning, it is important to emphasize that I am not denying the ex-
istence of "hard cases," where the relevant legal texts and interpretive prac-
tices underdetermine the result.8" In The Legal Process, Hart and Sacks
confidently assert that "[u]nderlying every rule and standard ... is at least a
policy and in most cases a principle [which is] available to guide judgment
in resolving uncertainties about the arrangement's meaning.""8 Although I
share their belief that underlying purposes, policies, and principles are
available to guide judgment, the passage quoted is made too strong by the
singular nouns-a policy, a principle. Many legal rules and standards serve
multiple, sometimes conflicting purposes. In addition, purpose is not the
only key to a statute's meaning-the express language of the statute may be
in conflict with its purpose, and there may be other indications, such as leg-
islative history and context, that cut against the interpretation suggested by
the apparent purpose (even if there is only one). For these reasons, there are
a great many cases in which a competent judge or lawyer, reasoning in good
faith, could reach result A or result B, and be deemed by a competent ob-
server to have performed her job adequately.89 An observer might disagree
with B, and believe that A was the better result, but nevertheless concede
that B was within the range of plausible, justifiable results.9"
these criteria still calls for the exercise of judgment, as opposed to deductive reasoning. The point is not
that the student's judgment in my example, or the ascription of responsibility in Moore's, is incapable of
being justified or theorized, but that the precise nature of reasoning process is often opaque to the person
exercising judgment.
87 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 52, at 115-16; BURTON, supra note 7, at xii, 5-12, 47-
48, 79-80. The term "hard cases" is associated with Dworkin's debate with Hart. See RONALD
DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in DWORKIN, supra note 77, at 81.
88 HART & SACKS, supra note 53, at 148.
89 Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and the Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That
Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 368-69 (1975).
90 1 do not believe it is possible to define "plausible" legal arguments in mathematical term -e.g.,
whether a 10% chance, a 30% chance, and so on, is necessary before we can deem an interpretation of
law plausible. These numbers create an illusion of precision by masking the uncertainty and guesswork
that goes into coming up with the number. Instead, the plausibility standard should be understood in
terms of an attitude or conviction on the part of the lawyer who offers the interpretation and may be
fleshed out with reference to a kind of hypothetical reasonable observer. Plausibility certainly requires
more than passing the proverbial straight-face test. One possible heuristic is that if a lawyer would be
comfortable making the argument to the judge for whom she clerked, a professor she respects, or a col-
1195
99:1167 (2005)
HeinOnline -- 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1195 2004-2005
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
For example, consider a municipal ordinance that bans vehicles in ex-
cess of 6000 pounds from residential streets. The ordinance is intended to
reduce wear and tear on municipal streets, as well as prevent accidents
caused by heavy trucks driving in residential neighborhoods. Does the or-
dinance apply to monster sport-utility vehicles like the Ford Excursion and
Cadillac Escalade? 9 Not only do large SUVs fall within the prohibition
created by the literal language of the statute, but they pose many of the
same dangers; they are within the "mischief' sought to be remedied by the
statute, as British lawyers would say.92 On the other hand, these ordinances
were mostly enacted before the widespread craze for SUVs, particularly the
subgenre of gigantic vehicles that weigh as much as commercial trucks.
The drafters of the ordinances probably did not intend to target vehicles that
are owned primarily for personal use. Moreover, the law is generally quite
lenient on SUVs, granting their owners special tax breaks and their manu-
league who is known for her good sense and judgment, the argument is plausible. If the lawyer could
stand behind an interpretation, take pride in it, and offer it to a third party the lawyer respects for her
sound judgment, then the interpretation is plausible.
I recognize that it can be difficult to give a rigorous logical account of the distinction between a
plainly implausible legal argument (say, one with only a 1% chance of success) and a clearly plausible
one (say, one with a 98% chance of success), just as it is difficult to differentiate formally between a
heap of stones and a non-heap. See Sorites Paradox, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY
864 (Robert Audi ed., 2d ed. 1999); Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philoso-
phical Issues, 82 CAL. L. REv. 509 (1994). But law does not lend itself to bivalent logic (i.e., heap vs.
non-heap, or frivolous vs. non-frivolous) and always demands the exercise of judgment. Further support
for this assertion must await the arguments in Part III. As a preliminary matter, even if we are uncertain
whether we need three, four, five, or n stones to make a heap, it does not mean that there are no such
things as heaps. Moore, supra note 86, at 332. By analogy, even if we may be unsure on the margins
whether an argument is frivolous, we should not conclude that there is no such thing as a frivolous ar-
gument.
In some contexts the law governing lawyers does adopt pseudo-mathematical standards for plausibil-
ity or frivolousness. For example, Treasury Department Circular 230, regulating practice before the In-
temal Revenue Service, permits a lawyer to sign a tax retum only where each position in the return has a
"realistic possibility of being sustained on its merits." See 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a) (2004). "Realistic pos-
sibility" is further defined as "approximately a one in three, or greater likelihood" of being sustained on
the merits. Id. § 10.34(d)(1); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 352(1985) (also adopting a "realistic possibility" standard); ABA SPECIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON
FORMAL OPINION 85-352, reported in 39 TAx LAW. 635, 638 (1986) (stating that a position with a 5%
to 10% chance of success on the merits would not have a realistic possibility of success, while one with
a one in three chance would). As suggested previously, I believe these numbers only obscure the issue
by deflecting attention away from the lawyer's attitude toward the interpretation. "Realistic possibility"
seems better defined in terms of something like "confident endorsement" or whether the lawyer would
be comfortable putting her reputation for sound judgment on the line by standing behind the interpreta-
tion.
91 See Andy Bowers, California's SUV Ban, SLATE, Aug. 4, 2004, at http://slate.msn.com/
id/2104755.
92 See Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584).
1196
HeinOnline -- 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1196 2004-2005
Professionalism as Interpretation
facturers exemptions from passenger car fuel economy standards.93 Thus,
one could plausibly argue that the most reasonable interpretation of the or-
dinance would not apply to SUVs.
What is critical in hard cases is that the judge argues for A or B on the
basis of what might be called "internal" legal reasons, and do so in a way
that is respectful of the social function of law.94 In order to respect the law,
these justifications must be based on reasons that could be advanced pub-
licly in an adversarial process in which reasons are given in support of
one's position.95 It is not necessary that all interpreters agree on the result,
as long as the result is justifiable in principle on the basis of internal legal
reasons. Internal legal reasons are simply those grounds (texts, principles
that are fairly deemed to underlie and justify legal rules, interpretive prac-
tices, hermeneutic methods, and so on) that are properly regarded in a pro-
fessional community as appropriate reasons to offer in justification of a
result. In the SUV case, the arguments back and forth were offered on the
basis of reasons such as the underlying policies (reducing wear and tear on
streets), traditional canons of statutory construction (the mischief rule), and
interpretive practices that place a single text in a broader legal context (ob-
serving the solicitude for SUVs in environmental and tax law). Perhaps it is
most natural to define internal legal reasons negatively, as excluding extra-
neous factors such as a bribe, gratitude for a party's support in a judicial
election, information excluded by evidentiary rules, the flip of a coin, or
what the judge ate for breakfast.96 Providing a positive definition of internal
legal reasons is a major task of analytic jurisprudence, and the next Part will
consider how seemingly esoteric academic debates can actually have a great
93 See Union of Concerned Scientists, Tax Incentives: SUV Loophole Widens, Clean Vehicle Cred-
its Face Uncertain Future, at http://www.ucsusa.org/clean-vehicles/cars and-suvs/page.cfm?
pagelD=1280 (last visited Aug. 4, 2004).
94 In fairness to Hart and Sacks, they recognize the problem of indeterminacy:
It may even be said that more than one answer is permissible, in the sense that if one answer had
been conscientiously reached and generally accepted a reviewing court might well think it ought
not to be upset, even though its own answer would have been different as an original matter.
HART & SACKS, supra note 53, at 149. Fairly or not, however, The Legal Process has become known as
the locus classicus of the attribution-of-purpose method of statutory interpretation, and Hart and Sacks
are usually understood to have relied on an assumption that a statute, case, or legal doctrine has a single
purpose standing behind it. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 55, at 333-37. I do want to make
clear that I do not subscribe to the interpretation of Hart and Sacks that assumes a single purpose lying
behind a regime of legal rules and standards.
95 See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 49-53
(2004) (arguing that the rule of law does not require invariance, but does require public justification).
96 The familiar reference to "what the judge had for breakfast" as a basis for judicial decisions is a
caricature of American legal realism. Most realists believed that judicial decisions fell into predictable
patterns, influenced by various social forces. Only a small faction of realists argued that the reasons for
judicial decisions were completely idiosyncratic, a claim whose plausibility is undermined by the ability
of lawyers to predict judicial decisions with a fair degree of reliability. See generally Brian Leiter,
American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY
(Martin Golding ed., 2004).
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deal of practical significance in shaping the way lawyers understand their
role in relation to the law.
Before moving on to that discussion, however, it is necessary to con-
sider a seeming inconsistency between the demands of professionalism in
litigation versus transactional and counseling contexts. In an easy case, a
lawyer is not justified in urging a court to adopt a spurious interpretation of
law; neither is she permitted to structure a transaction in order to take ad-
vantage of an illegitimate construction of applicable legal rules. The law
governing lawyers-both the state bar disciplinary rules and the law of civil
procedure-prohibits advancing frivolous legal arguments. 7 In a hard case,
however, it is an implication of professionalism that a lawyer may advocate
for an interpretation in litigation that she would be prohibited from adopting
as the basis for legal advice to a client or the structure of a transaction.
There are such contextual distinctions in the law of lawyering, most notably
in the Securities and Exchange Commission's regulations implementing the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This Act requires lawyers in some cases to report in-
formation "up the ladder" within a corporation where they reasonably be-
lieve their client is committing certain wrongful acts, but do not require
reporting up where the lawyer is representing the client in litigation over the
wrongful act.98 The distinction may nevertheless be incoherent if it amounts
to a requirement that the lawyer assert, in litigation, an interpretation of the
law that she would be prohibited from relying upon in transactional repre-
sentation.99
It is important to note that my distinction between the transactional and
litigation contexts is not an ontological or epistemological claim that the
law is actually different in these contexts, or that it may be more easily re-
covered in one setting than the other. The applicable law and the process of
interpretation are the same in both settings. The difference is, in hard cases,
the responsibility to serve as a custodian of the law is primarily the judge's,
with limited coordinate duties on lawyers to avoid advancing frivolous legal
arguments, withholding adverse legal authority missed by the adversary,
falsifying evidence, or permitting perjury to taint the record.' The lawyer
is justified in advancing an aggressive or novel interpretation of law in liti-
gation, as long as there is some good faith basis for the argument, because
97 See MODEL RULES, supra note 20, R. 3.1; FED. R. Civ. P. 11; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 (2000).
98 Compare 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(2)-(3) (2003) (duty to report where representing issuer in non-
litigation context), with 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(7)(ii) (no duty to report up where lawyer retained "[t]o as-
sert, consistent with his or her professional obligations, a colorable defense on behalf of the issuer ... in
any investigation or judicial or administrative proceeding relating to such evidence of a material viola-
tion").
99 Thanks to Dennis Tuchler and Emily Sherwin for raising this problem with me.
100 For these litigation-related duties, see MODEL RULES, supra note 20, R. 3.1 (frivolous legal ar-
guments), R. 3.3(a)(1), (3) (perjury), R. 3.3(a)(2) (adverse legal authority), R. 3.4(b) (falsifying evi-
dence).
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the judge is always in a position to reject it. Metaphorically, the lawyer in a
litigated matter may aim somewhat less accurately at the law, and trust the
procedures of adjudication to ensure the right result in the end. A judge, or
a lawyer in a transactional matter must take more care and aim more pre-
cisely. The law is the same in both cases, but the responsibility for getting
it right shifts among the various actors in the legal system, depending on the
degree of procedural checking that is available.' °'
Transactional and planning situations are distinctive precisely because
there is no impartial referee to resist the lawyer's client-centered construc-
tion of the law. The lawyer is the sole legal interpreter and is therefore, in
effect, a law-giver from the client's point of view. As such, the lawyer has
the power to shape the law for good or for ill. As Spider-Man observed,
with great power comes great responsibility, for if the lawyer does not in-
ternalize the judicial virtues of impartiality and objectivity, the law will be
distorted by partisan zeal where no neutral third party can check this ten-
dency. In litigation, the lawyer's partisan stance and greater flexibility to
advance aggressive or novel interpretations of legal rules makes the law it-
self more flexible and adaptable. If similar interpretive license were permit-
ted in transactional work, however, the legal system would lose some of the
virtues identified with the rule of law, such as stability, predictability, and
certainty. Legal theory must always balance the need for growth and
change with the values of stability and resistance to manipulation. The dis-
tinction between transactional and litigation-related representation is one
way to strike this balance.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR PROFESSIONALISM
A. Identification and Interpretation of Legal Norms
I have been defending the view that the social function of law is the
settlement of uncertainty and normative conflict, and this requires a system
of legal norms that can be identified without reference to the truth of moral
beliefs. This is an argument about the nature of law. Even if one accepts
this account of the nature of law, however, there can be further controversy
over the law in a given case.' °2 The law on a particular issue must be suffi-
101 Cf WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 45, § 204.2.2, at 77 (noting that the ABA's opinion on tax ad-
vising seems to require a lawyer to weigh the relevant authorities just as a court would when considering
the issue). The claim that a lawyer's "caretaker" responsibility varies by the degree of procedural
checking is also supported by IRS regulations which permit lawyers to take more aggressive or adver-
sarial positions in tax filings as long as they are adequately disclosed to the IRS. See Circular 230 Regu-
lating Practice Before the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a) (2002).
102 Hart drew this distinction, which he accused Dworkin of blurring. See Hart, supra note 77, at
247-48. Waldron explicitly connects the problem of interpretation with the authority of law: "If en-
acted law is to settle at least some cases at the level of particularity at which they present themselves, a
rule of recognition will need to provide a basis for specifying not only which proposal, but which ver-
sion of a given proposal, has been enacted." WALDRON, supra note 9, at 39.
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ciently determinate such that the matter may be resolved by reference to the
law, rather than to any of the reasons that were at stake in the underlying
normative disagreement. The question of the identity of the law, as op-
posed to the nature of law, is case-specific and interpretive. It can be stated
concisely in one of the following ways: "What does it mean to say that a
proposition of law is true?""1 3 or "With respect to some action, is it legally
permitted?"
The controversy about the law can also be understood in terms of crite-
ria for the objectivity of legal decisions. If a judge decides that there is a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage, or to obtain an abortion, or to use
marijuana for the purpose of alleviating pain, the question naturally arises
whether the decision is just the judge's subjective belief about what the law
ought to be, or whether it is in fact an accurate report on what the law is, or
at least a defensible judgment where the legal issue could have more than
one plausible resolution.)" Most attempts to understand the nature of objec-
tivity in legal reasoning have addressed the predicament of a judge who
must decide a case, or a critic of a judicial decision. 5 With respect to an
interpretive question in law, if there is an objective or determinate right an-
swer, a range of plausible right answers, or at least a wrong answer, then it
is possible to criticize the judge for making a mistake. If there is no such
thing as objectivity or determinacy in law, however, the law does not pro-
vide a standpoint for criticizing the judge.
Lawyers too, must worry about whether legal interpretation can be ob-
jective or determinate, because when they act in a representative capacity,
they enable or limit their clients' enjoyment of legal entitlements.0 6 If a
client has a legal right to disinherit his son for opposing the war in Viet-
nam,"0 7 but his lawyer refuses to draft a will with this effect because of her
moral disagreement with the client's desire, the lawyer has blocked the cli-
ent's enjoyment of a right that the legal system would recognize if as-
serted-namely, the right to cut his son out of his inheritance. The client
may be able to find another lawyer to draft the will, but regardless of
103 See DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW & TRUTH 3 (1996).
104 See Fiss, supra note 62, at 742.
105 The most helpful discussions include KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVITY (1992);
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 110-16 (1993); Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy,
Objectivity, and Authority, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 203 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995); Andrei Mar-
mor, Three Concepts of Objectivity, in POSITIVE LAW AND OBJECTIVE VALUES 112 (2001); Gerald J.
Postema, Objectivity Fit for Law, in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS 99 (Brian Leiter ed., 2001).
106 EISENBERG, supra note 62, at 10 ("[I]n the vast majority of cases where law becomes important
to private actors, as a practical matter the institution that determines the law is not the courts, but the le-
gal profession...."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 23 cmt. c
(2000) ("Lawyers who exercise their skill and knowledge so as to deprive others of their rights or to ob-
struct the legal system subvert the justifications of their calling.").
107 Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 7-8
(1975) (using this example to illustrate the tension between legal entitlements and ordinary moral rea-
sons).
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whether the client eventually gets his wish, one could ask whether the
original lawyer acted wrongly vis-A-vis the client's legal entitlement. The
first step in that analysis would be to ascertain the content of the law of
wills. For example, in Louisiana a parent can disinherit a child for only one
of ten enumerated "just causes," which must be set forth specifically in the
will. °8 Unless the hypothetical occurred in Louisiana, however, the testa-
tor's freedom is virtually unrestricted, except by pretermitted heir statutes,
which require that the will expressly state the intent to disinherit the son.'09
In a state with such a statute, the lawyer may believe her refusal to cooper-
ate with the client to be morally justified, and she may further believe that
her moral obligation not to assist the client outweighs her moral obligation
to obey the law. But as long as she is a competent lawyer, she will not deny
that the governing law would have permitted the client to disinherit his son.
This is obviously an exceptionally simple example,"' but it illustrates
what is at stake for lawyers in the attempt to characterize objectivity in legal
interpretation: If the objectively correct interpretation of an applicable legal
norm is that the client has a right to do X, then the lawyer in an existing
lawyer-client relationship must justify her refusal to assist the client in do-
ing X in moral terms. On the other hand, if one cannot say objectively that
legal norms permit the client to do X, then the lawyer has no burden to jus-
tify her refusal morally-she can appeal instead to an interpretation of the
law. Notice that the will example assumes the lawyer is motivated not to
assist her client. The possibility that law is indeterminate creates a differ-
ent, but equally serious ethical problem if the lawyer is motivated to do
anything at all for her (presumably high-paying) client. If one cannot say
objectively that the client is not legally entitled to do Y, and Y is a socially
harmful thing to do, then the lawyer may assist her client doing Y to cause a
108 See Max Nathan, Jr., An Assault on the Citadel: A Rejection of Forced Heirship, 52 TUL. L.
REV. 5, 12 (1977). None of the grounds stated would encompass Wasserstrom's hypothetical-they
cover situations such as the child "rais[ing] his hand to strike a parent" or an adult child failing to com-
municate with a parent, without just cause, for two years. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1621 (West
2001).
109 See WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, JR., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 3.6 (1988).
Ito Simple examples are sometimes useful to argue against the view that all legal texts present seri-
ous problems of indeterminacy. See BURTON, supra note 7, at 9-10 nn.20-21 (citing extensive collec-
tion of Critical Legal Studies sources urging that indeterminacy is a pervasive and unavoidable aspect of
legal interpretation). Although it is possible to overgeneralize from easy cases, it is nevertheless worth
noting that there are practically infinite examples that can be offered of uncontroversial interpretation of
legal norms. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). The strongest form of the indeterminacy claim-that "'doctrinal incon-
sistency necessarily undermines the force of any conventional legal argument"--is fairly straightfor-
wardly refuted by stating propositions such as, the "first paragraph of this essay does not slander Gore
Vidal." Id. at 471-72 (citing Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94
Yale L.J. 997 (1985)); cf PUTNAM, supra note 42, at 116-19 (arguing against the view that interpreta-
tion is called for in every case).
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significant amount of harm, and there is no legal standpoint from which we
can criticize the lawyer for helping the client do Y.
In order to determine whether lawyers are subject to criticism from the
point of view of the law, we must first determine what the law is with re-
spect to the transaction in which the lawyer's services are being employed.
Except in simple examples like the railroad case or the Louisiana will hypo-
thetical, ascertaining the law in real world situations is not a matter of read-
ing unambiguous statutory language and applying the rule it announces to a
case within the core of the statute's plain meaning."1 ' Finding the relevant
rule is a much more complicated interpretive exercise in most cases, be-
cause of familiar problems with the use of verbally formulated rules to
guide conduct. In Hart's well known formulation, legal rules have an "open
texture.""' 2 That is, rules do not determine the scope of their own applica-
tion, but there must always be something (another rule perhaps, or a con-
ventional practice in the relevant community) that picks out the instances of
some phenomenon falling under the rule.' 3
It is tempting to respond that a legal judgment is objectively true if it
corresponds with something "out there," like "what the law really is" in a
particular case. In general, correspondence theories of truth are widely be-
lieved to be fatally flawed, for a number of reasons, one of which is particu-
larly relevant to the attempt to use correspondence as a criterion for legal
objectivity." 4 Suppose we wish to know whether the sentence "the cat is on
the mat" is true. The correspondence theory of truth says it is true if the
sentence p ("the cat is on the mat") corresponds to a state of affairs in the
world W (cat on mat), in some kind of appropriate correspondence-
relationship C, whatever that may be. Schematically, we can represent this
truth condition as pCW. Now, have we got it right? Does p correspond to
I For the terminology of "core" meaning, see H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, 607 (1958). In Hart's words,
[i]f we are to communicate with each other at all, and if, as in the most elementary form of law, we
are to express our intentions that a certain type of behavior be regulated by rules, then the general
words we use ... must have some standard instance in which no doubts are felt about its applica-
tion.
Id. at 607.
112 HART, supra note 27, at 124-36.
113 Id. at 126. Another way to make this point is to distinguish between two categories of rules:
conduct rules, which are addressed to citizens and permit or forbid certain acts, and decision rules,
which are addressed to officials and regulate what these officials do when they apply or interpret the
law. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 40, at 627. As Dan-Cohen argues, "[t]he proper relationship between
decision rules and their corresponding conduct rules is not a logical or analytic matter." Id. at 629.
Rather, one must make a normative argument about the kinds of decision rules we want, in light of the
relevant policies and values. The position advanced in the following textual discussion differs from
Dan-Cohen's model of the relationship between decision rules and conduct rules in that it does not con-
cede the existence, as a logical matter, of a rule that can be both a conduct rule and a decision rule. Cf
id. at 631.
114 This discussion is drawn from SIMON BLACKBURN, SPREADING THE WORD: GROUNDINGS IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 224-29 (1984).
1202
HeinOnline -- 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1202 2004-2005
Professionalism as Interpretation
W in the right way? This is to ask the question whether pCW itself is true,
which suggests there may be some property of the world W'to which pCW
may or may not correspond. So pCW is true if pCWCW' Then it is open
for us to ask whether pCWCW' is true. We are thus faced with an infinite
regress in which there is no foundational fact-and-correspondence relation-
ship about which we cannot in principle ask whether it is true. Something
else must serve as criteria of truth, such as coherence with other beliefs, or a
normative community practice of manifesting agreement with the speaker
who utters "there is a cat on the mat" under certain conditions." 5
In legal reasoning, if there is any vagueness, open-texture, or uncer-
tainty in the law, however, it is an open question whether the judgment cor-
responds to the law as it is. The sentence "the judgment corresponds to the
law" is itself contestable, and the attempt to specify truth conditions for that
sentence leads us down the same path of infinite regress. In other words,
the correspondence relationship is impossible to pin down using only the
concept of correspondence. We need something else to give genuine con-
tent to the notion of a truth-making relationship between an interpretation,
on the one hand, and legal texts, practices, and conventions, on the other.
Figuring out the nature of that "something else" has been a major preoccu-
pation of analytic jurisprudence. It is certainly an issue that arises in con-
nection with the argument for professionalism, because a lawyer who
adheres to the Holmesian bad man position would deny the status of "law"
to the considerations I claim should be relevant to legal interpretation by
transactional lawyers.
In jurisprudential terms, the problem can be stated in terms of Hart's
concept of a rule of recognition. In Hart's account, a legal system is "ma-
ture" rather than "primitive" to the extent it is characterized by a union of
primary and secondary rules." 6 Primary rules impose obligations, create
rights or permissions, and in other ways guide the day-to-day activities of
citizens. Secondary rules, by contrast, are rules respecting what can be
done with primary rules-they provide for orderly, formal change in pri-
mary rules, permit adjudication of disputes that arise under primary rules,
and so on. The most important of these secondary rules, essential to the
concept of a legal system, is a rule which provides binding criteria for legal
officials who must identify primary rules in order to interpret and apply the
law. This is the rule of recognition."7 It specifies general characteristics of
primary rules that identify some as law and the rest as non-law. In the sim-
plest case, the rule of recognition might state that any act passed by both
115 See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 52, at 113-14.
116 HART, supra note 27, at 91-94. Hart's term "primitive" is perhaps unfortunate, but he uses it
primarily as a thought experiment, not a characterization of any actual human society. A primitive legal
system, as Hart uses the term, would be a small, closely knit community in which people knew each
other and shared a thick set of values, so that they could effectively govern themselves by simple meth-
ods of social control. Id. at 92.
117 Id. at 94-95, 100.
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houses of Congress and signed by the President is law in the United States.
A more complex case might involve conditions for the valid interpretation
of law. For example, in the railroad case discussed in Part II, the issue was
whether the requirement of equipping "cars" with automatic couplers ap-
plied to locomotives. The text of the statute was clear, but there was con-
troversy over whether the word car includes locomotives. The applicable
rule of recognition included multiple, conflicting sub-rules governing the
interpretation of statutes, such as "remedial statutes should be construed
liberally" and expressio unius est exclusio alterius. In this case, the rule of
recognition acknowledges both interpretive principles as validly part of the
system of legal interpretation (as opposed to a mere policy argument about
the kind of statute it would be desirable to have), but does not resolve the
conflict between them.
The structure described by Hart gives rise to a paradox, however, be-
cause the rule of recognition cannot depend for its validity on any other
rule; otherwise the infinite regress problem would recur." 8 His ingenious
solution is to deny that there are legal rules or other norms that require offi-
cials to follow the rule of recognition. The rule of recognition, instead,
comes into existence because it is practiced, in the sense that officials re-
gard it as a standard for critically evaluating their own and others' con-
duct." 9 For this reason, moral and policy considerations can play a role in
legal reasoning, as long as there is a conventional practice among legal offi-
cials of making decisions with reference to these criteria. 2 ° Moral and pol-
icy reasons in effect become incorporated into law, to the extent that legal
officials, acting as interpreters of the law, take the attitude that they are
relevant to working out the law as it is, as opposed to as it should be. For
example, in common law adjudication moral reasons enter into the defini-
tion of concepts such as reasonableness in torts and unconscionability in
contracts. An "exclusive" rule of recognition that screened out moral rea-
sons from consideration by legal officials would be unable to account for
this feature of the common law. The convergence by officials on a standard
for identifying legal norms, and the internal attitude that officials take to-
ward the rule as a reason for action, are the criteria for legality. A further
rule whose credentials as a legal rule would themselves stand in need of
certification by the rule of recognition is unnecessary.
118 Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart's Way out, in HART'S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO
THE CONCEPTOFLAW 149, 150-53 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001).
119 Id. at 154; HART, supra note 27, at 116-17; RONALD DwORKIN, The Model of Rules II, in
DWORKIN, supra note 77, at 46, 49.
120 This is known as "soft" or "inclusive" positivism. See W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL
POSITIVISM (1994); Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference
Thesis, 4 LEGAL THEORY 381 (1998); E. Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The
Hart/Dworkin Dispute, 75 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1977). Hart accepted inclusive positivism in the posthu-
mously published Postscript to The Concept of Law. See Hart, supra note 77, at 247-48.
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Because it is a product of conventional behavior by officials and the at-
titude of acceptance of the rule as a guide to conduct, the rule of recognition
need not be formally expressed as a rule, or written down in any authorita-
tive legal document.' 2' Thus, one might wonder whether legal judgments
can be objective, if they have no foundation other than social practices.
Specifically in regard to this Article, one might wonder whether the inter-
pretive stance of professionalism is validated as a legal standard by the ap-
plicable rule of recognition, whether it is just my subjective policy
preference or, as a third possibility, whether it is an objectively binding
principle of legal interpretation that is not validated by the rule of recogni-
tion. It is important at this juncture not to overstate the requirements for a
judgment to be objective. Even a strong conception of objectivity need not
require something like Platonic forms or correspondence with the fabric of
the universe to underwrite the truth of a proposition. Rather, objectivity in
law need be only moderately domain-specific, meaning that the characteris-
tics of an objective judgment in the natural sciences will differ in some re-
spects from that which makes a judgment objective in art criticism,
basketball officiating, or faculty hiring decisions.1
21
An objective judgment in any endeavor must have certain characteris-
tics: (1) independence from the subjectivity of the judging subject, open-
ness to the subject matter, and willingness to base judgments on the subject
itself, not personal idiosyncrasies; (2) amenability to evaluation of the cor-
rectness of judgments, or standards for assessing judgments; and (3) invari-
ance across judging subjects.' 23 A decision to follow a norm that is capable
of serving as a Hartian rule of recognition satisfies these criteria-in Hart's
words, political officials "manifest their own acceptance" of the rule of rec-
ognition,'24 acknowledging that whether a norm counts as a rule of recogni-
tion is independent of the official's subjectivity. The official also
acknowledges that the rule of recognition is a product of the shared accep-
tance of the norm, which indicates acceptance of standards for evaluating
the correctness of this judgment. Finally, there must be a high degree of in-
variance in officials' acceptance of the norm, or there would be a general
collapse in the efficacy of the legal system.'25 As Hart recognized, there
may be some disagreement at the margins of a rule of recognition, but as
long as there is a "normally concordant" practice of identifying law with
reference to certain criteria, one exists.'
26
121 HART, supra note 27, at 101-03.
122 See Postema, supra note 105, at 100.
123 Id. at 105-09; see also RAWLS, supra note 105, at 110-12; Fiss, supra note 62, at 744 (objectiv-
ity implies that an interpretation can be measured against a set of norms that transcend the judging sub-
ject).
124 HART, supra note 27, at 102.
125 Id. at 103-04.
126 Id. at 109-10.
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For Hart, whether a rule of recognition exists is an empirical ques-
tion.'27 The content of the rule of recognition is an empirical question as
well.'28 One can ascertain the existence and content of a rule of recognition
by reading cases, doing legal sociology, or employing some other method
appropriate to discovering facts about a community's practices. One thing
an observer might discover is that interpretive practices by judges, lawyers,
legislators, and scholars frequently make reference to principles to justify a
conclusion that X is a true proposition of law. In contrast with rules, which
have a binary, all-or-nothing character,'29 principles are reasons in support
of a judge's decision, but not conclusive reasons in the way that rules are.
Two principles can conflict, and one can outweigh another, while both re-
main parts of the legal system; by contrast, when two rules conflict, one of
the rules must persist while the other is abandoned. 3 ' Ronald Dworkin con-
tends that Hart's rule of recognition has no place for principles, and thus
fails to explain the reasoning behind judicial decisions which are based on
principles as well as rules. For example, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mo-
tors,'3' the court's decision to impose liability for breach of warranty on a
car manufacturer, notwithstanding lack of privity of contract and contrac-
tual disclaimers of the warranty, was justified on the basis of a balancing of
competing reasons which existed outside any legal text such as a statute,
rule, or judicial opinion.'32 These reasons included the importance of free-
dom of contract and voluntary assumption of duties, which tended to sup-
port the defendant, and the public's interest in being protected from
dangerous products, which supported the plaintiff's position.
Principles in the Dworkinian sense are not the kind of extra-legal moral
arguments that one might make to criticize the law for being wrongheaded;
rather, they exist within the law and can serve as a link in the chain of an in-
127 Id. at 110. Dworkin criticizes Hart for arguing that social rules are constituted by behavior
while admitting that rules can be uncertain at the margins. DWORKIN, supra note 119, at 54. The Har-
tian distinction between the core and penumbra of rules can explain this apparent anomaly, because the
core of a rule of recognition will exist as long as it works most of the time, with only a few marginal un-
certainties.
128 HART, supra note 27, at 150 ("Which form of omnipotence ... our Parliament enjoys is an em-
pirical question concerning the form of rule which is accepted as the ultimate criterion in identifying the
law.").
129 DWORKIN, supra note 77, at 24.
130 Id. at 26-27. In his response to Dworkin contained in the Postscript to The Concept of Law,
Hart refers to this feature of principles as their "non-conclusive" character. Hart, supra note 77, at 261.
He argues that Dworkin exaggerates this distinction between rules and principles, and that there are
many instances in which two legal rules conflict and one is held to outweigh the other. Hart also points
out that in cases where a principle conflicts with a rule and the principle prevails, the rule is not aban-
doned. Id. at 262.
131 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
132 Dworkin discusses Henningsen at DWORKIN, supra note 77, at 23-24.
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ternal justificatory argument.'33 (In Henningsen, the Chrysler Corporation
would presumably be horrified at the prospect that it could be forced to pay
money to an injured person solely on the basis of some judge's beliefs
about right and wrong. To legitimately expropriate money from Chrysler,
perhaps forcibly, the decision must be based on the kind of reasons that or-
dinarily justify the use of coercive force.) Because they are part of the law,
lawyers can no more ignore these principles than they can omit express
statutory or common-law rules from their reasoning process.'34 Thus, my
claim that lawyers appeal to extra-textual norms constraining their interpre-
tive activities can be understood as an appeal to Dworkinian principles,
which mandate an attitude of respect toward the law and legal interpreta-
tion. "[I]n most contexts lawyers can fairly readily tell the difference be-
tween making good-faith efforts to comply with a plausible interpretation of
the purposes of a legal regime, and using every ingenuity of his or her trade
to resist or evade compliance."'35  This observation seems to reflect the
presence of a special class of Dworkinian principles within the legal sys-
tem, which are what I term attitudes or stances adopted by officials, and
quasi-officials such as lawyers, toward the law. In jurisprudential terms,
my argument is that a reasonable rule of recognition actually does, and must
include not only considerations of pedigree (i.e., whether the legislature en-
acted a particular text or whether a judge decided a case) but also extra-
textual interpretive norms that specify which of several textually support-
able interpretations are consistent with the social function of the law.'36
The opposing argument from the Holmesian bad man perspective is
that a lawyer need not counsel and assist the client within the bounds of law
as defined by good faith efforts and plausible interpretations-rather, the
lawyer need only respect arguable or non-frivolous constructions of legal
norms.'37 Which of these interpretive stances is the right one to take toward
legal norms? One way to answer this question is to determine whether
133 Id. at 35, 44; DWORKIN, supra note 87, at 85, 115. Hart contended that judges exercise law-
making power in cases that lay far out in the penumbra of rules. See HART, supra note 27, at 135, 145.
134 Dworkin argues that principles do not have the same pedigree as judicial decisions and stat-
utes-rather, they are a product of a "sense of appropriateness developed in the profession." DWORKIN,
supra note 77, at 40. Hart responds that there is no reason why principles cannot be identified by pedi-
gree criteria, "in that they have been consistently invoked by courts in ranges of different cases as pro-
viding reasons for decision." Hart, supra note 77, at 265.
135 Gordon, supra note 43, at 48.
136 1 am grateful to Emily Sherwin for pressing me to clarify some ambiguities in this discussion.
137 See Gordon, supra note 7, at 1194-97. David Luban argues that Holmes invented his image of
the lawyer advising a "bad man" client in order to make a jurisprudential point about the separability of
law and morality. See David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on
Holmes's The Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547, 1562 (1997). Holmes can therefore be under-
stood as making the same point as Dworkin-if a norm is not part of the legal system, a judicial decision
based on that norm is not legitimate from the point of view of a client who is bound by it. Dworkin's
response, of course, is very different from Holmes's, for instead of insisting on a bright-line separation
of law and morality, Dworkin enthusiastically incorporates morality into law.
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courts require clients to arrange their affairs to comply with the law inter-
preted in light of substantive principles, values, and social interests. In
other words, we can make a descriptive argument for a particular rule of
recognition that takes into account interpretive norms, stances, and atti-
tudes. However, descriptive arguments cannot settle with finality the ques-
tion of whether the attitude of professionalism is a part of our legal system.
One could read every case and conduct exhaustive empirical sociologi-
cal research and never know the answer for sure. There are two reasons for
this. The first is that the rule of recognition, like any legal rule, is character-
ized by its open texture.138 There may be a situation in which there is fac-
tual uncertainty regarding the content of the rule of recognition, and in that
situation some institution will be called upon to make an unconstrained
choice about the specific contours of the ultimate rule for identifying law.
There are no rules requiring one result or another-as Hart puts it, "at the
fringe of these very fundamental things, we should welcome the rule-
sceptic."' 39 The second is the now-familiar infinite regress problem. No
amount of rules and meta-rules can settle an interpretive question with fi-
nality. Hart grounded the rule of recognition in social practices to avoid the
regress problem, and we might take the same way out with respect to pro-
fessionalism. A more promising approach, therefore, would be to provide
an extra-legal justification for professionalism-one based on the nature
and function of law, and therefore the reasons for treating legal directives as
authoritative. In other words, we would be giving a normative rather than a
conceptual or descriptive argument for positivism.'40
Philosophers of law ask the conceptual question "what distinguishes
law from other means of social ordering?"'' because law does a distinctive
kind of work. My claim has been that the function of law is to secure the
conditions necessary for cooperation and the realization of collective goods,
notwithstanding deep and persistent disagreement over values, ends, con-
ceptions of the good, and the application of moral principles to practical
situations. In order to do this work, law must have certain characteristics.'42
138 HART, supra note 27, at 151.
139 Id. at 154. As Jules Coleman reconstructs Dworkin's argument against Hart's social rules the-
sis, "if there is substantial controversy [over the content of the rule of recognition], then there cannot be
convergence of behavior sufficient to specify a social rule." Coleman, supra note 77, at 15.140 See, e.g., ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 52, at 1; DWORKIN, supra note 119, at 50-52;
Jeremy Waldron, Normative (or Ethical) Positivism, in HART'S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE
POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LA W, supra note 118, at 410.
141 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 11-15 (1980).
142 See Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 210, 226-27
(1994). As Raz argues:
[A]ssume that the maintenance of orderly social relations is itself morally valuable. Assume fur-
ther that a legal system can be the law in force in a society only if it succeeds in maintaining or-derly social relations. A necessary connection between law and morality would then have been
established, without the legal validity of any rule being made, by the rule of recognition, to depend
on the truth of any moral proposition.
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It is tempting to say that the law must be uncontroversial,'43 but in anything
outside the core of the application of legal norms, common experience
shows that the law is anything but uncontroversial. In any event, the re-
quirement that the law be uncontroversial is usually interpreted as a con-
straint on a legal system's rule of recognition. Namely, the rule of
recognition must be capable of formulation without reference to the content
of moral principles. Significantly, this constraint on the rule of recognition
does not preclude the use in legal reasoning of moral principles that have
become incorporated into legal norms.'"
Preclusion of the content of moral norms is necessary to avoid slipping
back into the disagreement that required authoritative settlement by law.
But the preclusion of non-legal considerations that is the consequence of the
negative aspect of professionalism requires a lawyer to exclude moral prin-
ciples from her interpretive process only to the extent those principles are
not recognized as part of law by the relevant interpretive community. In
addition, the positive aspect of professionalism requires that the social func-
tion of law guide a lawyer's interpretive judgment. For this reason, inter-
pretive communities have evolved, and ought to evolve, higher-order
standards for differentiating artificial, abusive transactions that comply only
formally with legal rules from those transactions that comply substantially
with the law.
I suppose a lawyer could argue that she is unconcerned with the effec-
tive functioning of the law because it is a problem for legislators, rulemak-
ers, or judges, but not for her or her client. This attitude, however, would
be self-defeating and even irrational. Again picking up on an argument by
Robert Gordon, the response to this lawyer is that she must be concerned
about the effective functioning of the law, because without it, neither she
nor her client could realize their own interests. The market economy pre-
supposes a background of stable law, custom, and enforcement that en-
forces private ordering.'45 Even if a lawyer and client were concerned only
with pursuing their own narrow interests, paradoxically it is only possible to
Some philosophers believe that soft or inclusive positivism is vulnerable to Raz's authority argu-
ment, because the law could not perform its coordination function if those subject to its directives were
called upon to evaluate the truth of moral propositions incorporated into law. See, e.g., Kenneth Einar
Himma, Law's Claim of Legitimate Authority, in HART'S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO
THE CONCEPT OF LA w, supra note 118, at 271, 274-75. As mentioned above, professionalism as a the-
ory of legal ethics is a variety of soft positivism, because it permits reference to moral beliefs to the ex-
tent there is a conventional practice among legal officials of referring to these beliefs in legal reasoning.
This position does not run afoul of Raz's authority argument because affected citizens are not required
to ascertain whether a moral proposition is true, only whether officials have referred to it in the past
when explaining and justifying a legal decision.
143 See Coleman, supra note 77, at 9-11 (explaining that this account of legal positivism is proba-
bly Dworkin's target in The Model of Rules I, DWORKtN, supra note 77, but that there is another charac-
teristic of positivism, namely its conventionalism, that is plausible).
144 Id. at 15-16; see also Joseph Raz, Incorporation by Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2004).
145 Gordon, supra note 43, at 49; Gordon, supra note 7, at 1198-99.
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behave self-interestedly within a framework of other-regarding obligations.
A lawyer might evade regulatory requirements by aggressive structuring of
transactions in one case, but cause long-run damage by eroding the capabil-
ity of the legal system to facilitate the functioning of financial markets. The
lawyer cannot be indifferent to this long-term damage and still claim to be
making an ethical argument about the obligations of her role, because it is
in the nature of ethical arguments that they must be generalizable to rele-
vantly similar situations.'46 It may be true that a lawyer could game the sys-
tem once without causing catastrophic damage, but this is impermissible
free-riding on the cooperation of others. Thus, any plausible ethical argu-
ment-i.e., one that is worthy of the respect of similarly situated others-
must take account of the consequences of widespread manipulation of for-
mal legal norms.
B. Professionalism in Practice
This Article has developed a jurisprudential argument for the position
that lawyers ought to be guided by the informed judgment of a professional
community of lawyers, judges, and other interpreters, who are committed to
using the legal system to perform its social function of coordinating valu-
able social activity. Legal texts alone cannot accomplish this coordination,
because it is always possible for clever lawyers to manipulate formal norms
to accomplish results that are at odds with the evident purpose of the regime
of legal norms. Thus, if the law respecting any area of economic activity is
to possess sufficient stability to coordinate action, lawyers who counsel and
advise clients, and structure transactions, must do so in a way that could be
publicly justified to other members of the relevant community. Signifi-
cantly, the law already works in the way I have been recommending.'47 Al-
though there are numerous examples to offer, including the law of frivolous
litigation14 s and the implicit norms of good faith dealing observed in various
commercial communities,'49 I will concentrate on three examples-the eco-
nomic substance doctrine in the law of taxation, the law governing the
complex special-purpose entity (SPE) transactions that were used by Enron,
and the legal advice provided by government lawyers on the application of
domestic and international prohibitions on torture to the interrogation of de-
tainees in the war on terrorism.
146 See, e.g., T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 153 (1998).
147 As Milton Regan observes,
[m]uch of law practice consists of informal understandings about matters such as what arguments
are considered within the bounds of good faith, acceptable levels of aggressiveness, the scope ofdisclosure requirements, how to interact with regulatory agencies, and what constitutes due dili-
gence.
MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOu KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER 39 (2004).
148 See, e.g., William Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule I1-A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181 (1985).
149 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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1. Tax Shelters.-One of the recurring problems in the law of taxa-
tion is that the tax laws may be defeated through manipulation, that is, by
structuring transactions in a way that creates artificial tax consequences. 50
The difficult analytical question is obviously how to define "manipulation"
or "artificial," and this question only arises because it is possible for a
transaction to comply with formal legal norms while somehow failing to
satisfy the substantive standards or principles that those formal norms at-
tempt to express. The difficulty is perhaps particularly acute in tax law,
which supposedly does not concern itself with whether the taxpayer's intent
in entering into a transaction was to avoid taxes,'' but it must be faced in
any complex regulatory arena in which a client may seek the assistance of a
lawyer to avoid a legal prohibition or penalty through careful planning. The
danger of manipulation results from the familiar dichotomy between form
and substance, or rules and standards, in legal norms. 5' Briefly, the distinc-
tion depends on the conceptual possibility of divergence between the action
mandated (or prohibited) by a rule and the action mandated (or prohibited)
by the rule's background justification.'53 A legal norm in the form of a rule
permitting only people age sixteen or older to obtain a driver's license is
plainly justified by reasons of public safety, but the rule is both over-
inclusive and under-inclusive with respect to this background justification.
The rule may prevent mature, careful fifteen-year-olds from driving (over-
inclusiveness) as well as permitting reckless, dangerous twenty-year-olds to
obtain a license (underinclusiveness). One response to this problem is to
permit a decisionmaker to rely directly on the background justification, by
150 David P. Hariton, Sorting out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235, 236 (1999)
(noting that tax lawyers have tried to devise rules so that "business transactions do not permit some tax-
payers to avoid tax at the expense of others in a way that was not intended by the political system"); Jo-
seph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 863 (1982);
David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860, 860 (1999) ("[T]axpayers have
been able to manipulate the rules endlessly to produce results clearly not intended by the drafters.").
151 Alan Gunn, Tax Avoidance, 76 MICH. L. REV. 733, 735 (1978).
152 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976); Weisbach, supra note 150. Leo Katz denies that there is anything distinctively legal about this
distinction and argues that loopholes in the law result from a similar form/substance dichotomy in mo-
rality, which is simply reflected in the structure of law. Leo Katz, Form and Substance in Law and Mo-
rality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 566, 567 (1999).
153 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 53-55 (1991). The terminology of background
justification and the driver's license example, are from a contemporaneous article by Schauer. See Fre-
derick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645, 648-49 (1991); see also
Schauer, supra note 55, at 236. Significantly, the phenomenon of divergence between the result man-
dated by a general rule and what would be required after full attention to all the relevant features of a
situation is not limited to following legal rules. A similar dynamic exists in moral philosophy; indeed, a
well known criticism of Kantian ethics is that the emphasis by Kant on moral rules distorts the nature of
moral judgment by directing an agent to ignore morally relevant details of a problem. See HERMAN, su-
pra note 83, at 74-75.
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casting the norm in the form of a standard. In our example, the relevant
norm expressed as a standard might be that only competent, mature drivers
may obtain a license.
The distinction between rules and standards creates two sets of mirror-
image risks facing the regulator. Expressing a norm in a standard-like way
entails the loss of benefits associated with rules, such as ease of application,
error reduction, constraint on the decisionmaker's discretion (and therefore
power), and especially values of ex ante predictability and certainty of ap-
plication.'54 By contrast, expressing the norm in a rule-like way entails the
loss of the benefits associated with standards, such as sensitivity to the fit
between the outcome of the legal decision and the background justification
of the norm, and greater ex post contextualization and particularization of
the result, resulting in a more just result as between the parties.
In tax law, rules are generally favored for the additional reason that
many transactions are structured carefully in order to capture tax benefits,
even if the tax treatment of the given transaction was never foreseen or in-
tended.'55 In particular, a transaction with economic substance and a busi-
ness purpose may be structured in a "funny" way in order to take advantage
of a tax benefit that was not foreseen by Congress.' 56 The transaction is not
a sham, because it has economic substance and would have been undertaken
anyway, for business reasons. But the form of the transaction is artificial,
and highly tax-sensitive. Given the sensitivity of transactional structure to
tax consequences, there seems to be a heightened need for predictability in
tax law as opposed to, say, tort law, where many actors are less likely to be
influenced by the precise form of legal norms. Still, there must be limits on
the extent to which the formal (or rule-based) treatment of a transaction can
diverge from the substantive (or standard-based) approach-too great a di-
vergence and the system will be unfair as between similarly situated tax-
payers. ' There is accordingly great pressure to differentiate between real
transactions, undertaken in the ordinary course of a taxpayer's business for
legitimate business purposes, and the artificial transactions, with all their
Rube Goldberg complexity, set up with no purpose other than to generate
tax benefits. The result of this tension has been considerable confusion in
154 SCHAUER, supra note 153, at 135-66; see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).155 See, e.g., Yosha v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) ("There is no
rule against taking advantage of opportunities created by Congress or the Treasury Department for beat-
ing taxes .... Many transactions are largely or even entirely motivated by the desire to obtain a tax ad-
vantage."); Hariton, supra note 150, at 237 (noting the general presumption that the taxpayer "should
not be denied beneficial tax results which she stumbles upon, or even seeks out, in the course of her le-
gitimate business dealings, even if those results are obviously unanticipated, unintended, or downright
undesirable").
156 Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and
a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAx L. REv. 325, 337-40 (2002).
157 Hariton, supra note 150, at 236.
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the courts, which have applied a variety of substance-over-form doctrines in
cases in which a textualist style of interpretation would effectively reward
sophisticated evasion of the substantive meaning of the tax laws.'58
One way to distinguish between real and artificial transactions and
their tax consequences is to rely on the informed judgment of members of
the relevant professional community. As Mark Gergen observes, "[g]ood
tax lawyers know when they are pushing hard at the edge of the enve-
lope."'59 After observing the difficulty in arriving at determinate standards
of tax motive and economic substance, which would enable courts to deny a
positive result to a taxpayer who had complied formally with the rules, he
falls back on professional judgment to formulate a "disclaimer" that could
be attached to any analysis of form and substance in tax law:
A determination that an action is tax motivated or insubstantial is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for denying a positive tax result to which
the actor claims he is entitled under tax law. There may be other grounds for
rejecting the actor's position. These standards do not displace other forms of
reasoning. Further, some tax motivated or insubstantial actions are respected.
As for which are respected and which are not, that is difficult to say. Do not
always expect to find a rule or principle to sort them out. In a novel case the
best guide may well be professional common knowledge. 60
Similarly, tax lawyer Peter Canellos claims that everyone in the rele-
vant community knows the difference between creative tax planning and
bogus tax shelters, even though shelters are designed to mimic real transac-
tions.'6' In tax sheltering, "promoters attempt to apply a patina of substance
to a transaction that is formal and unreal," while legitimate tax practitioners
plan real business transactions with a business purpose, in light of the pos-
sibility of obtaining tax advantages.'62 As Canellos recognizes, all of these
terms are subject to a challenge that they be defined more precisely: What
makes a transaction real or unreal? What is the difference between a patina
of substance and creative structuring? Ever more elaborate rules cannot
provide the answers, however. Professional judgment is an irreducible as-
pect of the analysis, even though it may be possible to set out some stan-
dards or criteria that are germane to the exercise of judgment.'63
158 See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 56, at 21-25 (reviewing business purpose and sub-
stance-over-form doctrines); Allen D. Madison, The Tension Between Textualism and Substance-over-
Form Doctrines in Tax Law, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699, 722-36 (2003) (summarizing sham transac-
tion and recharacterization doctrines).
159 Mark P. Gergen, The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REV. 131, 136 (2001).
160 Id. at 138.
161 Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose
in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47, 51-52 (2001)
("[E]xperienced tax professionals can usually readily distinguish tax shelters from real transac-
tions ... ").
162 Id. at 50.
163 Id. at 53-54 ("Although in theory the line between a tax shelter and an aggressively structured
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Appeals to professional judgment lead to a predictable reaction-
charges of unprincipled decisionmaking, arbitrariness, non-transparency,
and a departure from the ideal of objectivity in law."6 Critics are apt to cite,
disparagingly, Justice Stewart's comment about hard-core pornography,
that he cannot define it, but he knows it when he sees it.'65 But recall the
previous discussion of judgment and objectivity. A judgment in this do-
main (e.g., "that is a tax shelter, not a legitimate transaction") can be objec-
tive as long as the decisionmaker is willing to base judgments on the subject
itself, not personal idiosyncrasies, is willing to be open to evaluation of the
correctness of her judgment, and makes a decision that exhibits some de-
gree of invariance across judging subjects.'66 This kind of limited domain-
specific objectivity can be secured by constraining all-things-considered
contextual judgments using more specific criteria which are developed over
a series of analogous cases. In the tax example, the taxpayer will not be de-
nied tax benefits as long as the transaction has a legitimate business pur-
pose. This standard can be defined further based on criteria such as:
" the way the transaction was marketed and sold-i.e., whether it
was pitched by specialized tax professionals and marketed to the
tax or finance department of a corporation, or instead developed
by outside investment advisors or internal operations departments
and marketed in terms of business or financing opportunities,
rather than tax savings;
" the involvement of real or extraneous parties-i.e., whether it in-
cluded real buyers and sellers, with financing at market rates, or
accommodation parties such as foreign subsidiaries or partner-
ships;
" the use of a series of highly choreographed steps; and
real transaction may appear difficult to draw, in actuality the distinction is rather easy to establish when
the transaction involves most of the tax shelter elements described above.").
164 The tax context provides several examples. See ACM P'ship v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231,
265 (3d Cir. 1998) (McKee, J., dissenting) ("I can't help but suspect that the majority's conclusion...
is, in its essence, something akin to a 'smell test."'); Isenbergh, supra note 150, at 874-76 (criticizing
the economic substance doctrine in taxation as an "essentially aesthetic response" which violates the
principle that tax rules should be interpreted narrowly and in accordance with the form, not the sub-
stance, of transactions); id at 882 ("It is not uncommon for professors to regard-and teach-the process
of legal interpretation as a vehicle for their own aesthetic preferences."). In legal theory generally, see
Farber, Inevitability, supra note 55, at 541-47, for a summary of critiques.
165 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). For an interesting, sym-
pathetic interpretation of Justice Stewart's reasoning, see Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know It When I See It, "
105 YALE L.J. 1023 (1996). Gewirtz's essay is a defense of what he calls nonrational elements of judi-
cial reasoning, such as judgment and character, and I think he is correct that these qualities can be de-
scribed as excellences or virtues. See id. at 1033.
166 Postema, supra note 105, at 105-09.
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* whether the workings of the transaction were concealed (and thus
reliant upon the audit lottery) or publicly disclosed.'67
Assuming that these evaluative criteria are generally shared within the
relevant community, the judgment of legitimate business purpose is suffi-
ciently objective.
I am hedging here a bit with the term "relevant" community. Canel-
los's article on tax shelters identifies two vastly different communities of
practitioners-the tax bar and the tax shelter bar.'68 "Real" tax practitioners
structure transactions that are otherwise legitimate in a way that maximizes
tax advantages; they are concerned with their reputation and status, and of-
ten become involved with high-profile organizations such as the tax sec-
tions of the ABA and the New York State Bar Association, which are
dedicated to improving the tax law. They consider exercising professional
167 Canellos, supra note 161, at 51-55. These criteria suggest that the community's evaluation-
that a transaction exhibits either legitimate tax avoidance or illegitimate tax evasion-is to a considera-
bly degree path dependent. See KATZ, supra note 15, at 57-73. As Katz puts it, there are deontological
features of a situation that should not be exploited merely to achieve, in a roundabout way, an outcome
that is more desirable from a consequentialist perspective. Id. at 57. This latter, specific principle does
not appear to add much to the persons-as-ends formulation of the Kantian categorical imperative. See
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS *429, at 36 (James W. Ellington
trans., 1981) (1785) ("Act in such a way that you treat humanity... always at the same time as an end
and never simply as a means."). I am also uneasy about the reduction of deontological morality to path-
dependent evaluations, because a strict deontologist would not approve of violating moral duties by any
means. In the puzzles Katz considers, the actor would be subject to criticism for violating the rights of
another either directly or indirectly, if both options had the effect of treating a person as a mere means,
in violation of that form of the categorical imperative. See KATZ, supra note 15, at 1-9 (posing numer-
ous hypotheticals). The more promising solution to the problems Katz considers is the distinction be-
tween regarding norms (legal or moral) either instrumentally or as legitimate reasons, which is the
position defended here. This is closer to the deontologist's strategy of approving of actions only if they
are done out of motives of duty. See KANT, supra, *397, at 9-10. For an insightful discussion of the
problem of constructing maxims of action that do not beg the questions against puzzles like Katz's, see
HERMAN, supra note 83, at 217-24. As Herman argues, considerations of value bear on the description
of actions and the construction of maxims. If this is correct (and I believe it is), it provides a sufficient
account of the choice-worthiness of a particular end and the path by which it is achieved, leaving noth-
ing puzzling about Katz's cases.
168 Canellos, supra note 161, at 55-57; see also Joseph Bankman, The Business Purpose Doctrine
and the Sociology of Tax, 54 SMU L. REv. 149, 150 (2001) (elaborating on Canellos's sociological
analysis of the two tax bars); Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-Opting the Tax Bar into
Dissuading Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX. REv. 43, 46 (2001) (arguing that "[m]any lawyers in-
volved in corporate tax-shelter activity are deeply troubled by the role they play"). Nancy Staudt sug-
gested in conversation that this informal sociology of the profession may not be entirely accurate, but for
the purposes of my normative argument, it is essential only to establish that different communities could
exist, and that one may do better than the others, in virtue of the values lying behind the legal system.
On the descriptive argument, I am not an expert in tax law, and must defer to others, who apparently
disagree on the boundaries around the various communities and the norms to which they are committed.
See also infra notes 174-177, and accompanying text, for a qualification on the ascription of intentions
to communities.
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judgment as a stock in trade.169 Tax shelter practitioners, on the other hand,
set up artificially contrived deals, care little about their reputation for pro-
bity and judgment, and provide legal opinions as a fig leaf for sheltering
transactions that are widely derided by real practitioners. So which of these
is the relevant community? If we specify real tax practitioners and then de-
rive evaluative criteria from their shared norms, are we not engaging in cir-
cular reasoning? The shared norms of the tax shelter bar and the criteria
they would generate for identifying abusive transactions (if any) would pre-
sumably look very different from those listed above. But why follow the
interpretive principles of the tax bar, not the tax shelter bar? Or, why regard
oneself as a member of the interpretive community that is constituted by fi-
delity to those norms? In theory, a lawyer may decide to remove herself
from the tax bar and join the tax shelter bar, which recognizes a different set
of standards of interpretation. 7 ° Even if the authority of a community's
disciplining rules do not depend on assent to those norms,17" ' it seems open
to practitioners to opt out of the community and opt into a different com-
munity, with a different set of disciplining rules.
A different way to frame this objection might be to claim that the re-
quirement of professionalism in interpretation only gains authority by boot-
strapping. That is, the obligation imposed by the attitude of professionalism
is a function of the relevant interpretive community and the standards it
recognizes for evaluating the correctness of legal judgments (i.e., "although
purely formal norms seem to permit X, the law as correctly interpreted pro-
hibits X"). At the same time, I seem to be claiming that a lawyer ought to
associate himself with the interpretive community that recognizes the atti-
tude of professionalism and shun other communities that do not. What is
the source of this meta-obligation? If the response were, "the obligation of
professionalism," that would indeed be bootstrapping. But the correct re-
sponse is given instead in terms of the social function of law: a relatively
stable, determinate framework of legal rights and obligations is necessary to
permit ordered cooperation among people who disagree on just about every-
thing except the need to reach settlement of disagreements.
If lawyers were permitted to adopt a Holmesian bad man interpretive
attitude (or to opt into a community which recognized that attitude as a
169 This description, particularly the elitism and emphasis on the exercise of judgment, calls to
mind Anthony Kronman's lawyer-statesman. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993).
170 See ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES 45-60 (1999) (discussing the possi-
bility that even if the role of doctor were constituted with certain obligations, a practitioner might opt to
become a "schmoctor" with different obligations, and that the concept of a role cannot prevent this kind
of maneuver); Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 855 (1990) (argu-
ing that there are multiple, overlapping communities to which one may belong, and that privileging the
dominant community tends to preserve the status quo); cf HERMAN, supra note 83, at 222-23 (arguing
that the form of maxims, for the purpose of consideration of conformity with the categorical imperative,
is given by an agent's regulative standards or projects).
171 Fiss, supra note 62, at 746.
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proper interpretation of the relevant law), then the law would end up having
no boundaries at all, no constraining capacity, and therefore no ability to
create authoritative settlement. This conclusion may sound unduly apoca-
lyptic, but experience with practices such as tax sheltering shows that law-
yers can always plan around formal legal norms, given sufficient resources
and creativity. Purely formal constraints such as legislation, rulemaking,
and enhanced enforcement will never be sufficient to eliminate abuses be-
cause lawyers are involved in constructing the bounds of the law.'72 As
Robert Gordon rightly observes, there are resources for strategic manipula-
tion within any set of adjudicative or administrative rules and procedures.'73
As a result, the effectiveness of the law depends on constraints exogenous
to formal legal norms.
Before moving on, however, we must consider one final objection.'74 I
have discussed "the community" and its interpretive practices as if it were a
thing to which an intention can be straightforwardly ascribed. In one sense,
this is just a convenient fiction-communities don't have practices or disci-
plining rules; community members follow these norms. The community's
standards can be located by observing convergent behavior by community
members,'75 but the community itself is not an intentional being. On the
other hand we speak quite naturally of collective intentions and norms and
attribute these mental states to groups.'76 In this case, we mean literally that
the group intends something and are no longer using collective intention as
a metaphor. Moreover, we do so even in the absence of some formal pro-
cedure, such as taking a poll that reveals the intentions of individuals and
aggregates them into a collective intention. Without formal procedures we
may reach a premature and incorrect conclusion about the group's inten-
tion," 7 so we must regard an ascription of group intention as potentially re-
visable, but talking as though the group has an intention is not incoherent.
172 Cf Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or
Law, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 177, 180 (Deb-
orah L. Rhode ed., 2000) ("Good lawyers understand that the ethical practice of law involves lawyers
simultaneously shaping legal boundaries and recognizing the real limits to this manipulation.").
173 Gordon, supra note 43, at 45.
174 I am indebted to Dennis Tuchler for pressing me to consider this problem.
175 HART, supra note 27, at 108-09.
176 Solan, supra note 81. 1 am aware of the extensive social-choice literature which purports to
show that there is no such thing as "the collective will" with respect to some outcome. See KATZ, supra
note 15, at 60-67 (citing studies and examples). Accepting that there is no single collective will prior to
some kind of aggregation procedure such as voting, it may nevertheless be the case that a collective
sense of the meaning of a scheme or rule emerges over time, as a series of test cases is decided, as mem-
bers of the group debate among themselves about how to resolve hypothetical disputes, and so on.
These collective understandings are often embodied in the form of uniform responses to paradigmatic
cases and can be extended to new situations by drawing analogies and distinctions. Although this proc-
ess is most familiar in common law reasoning, it is arguably a feature of moral reasoning as well. See
ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY (1988).
177 Solan, supra note 81.
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In the example here, it may turn out that the elite tax bar is more tolerant of
tax shelters than its more outspoken members would admit. This, however,
is an empirical challenge to the norms of a particular group, not a concep-
tual impediment to the general practice of imputing intentions to a collec-
tive body.
2. Structured-Finance Transactions at Enron.-Enron had a prob-
lem. It had an ambitious plan for growth that required billions of dollars in
cash, but it could not raise cash through conventional methods like selling
stock or borrowing from banks. The reason was simple-additional bor-
rowing would harm its credit rating and issuing additional equity would
hurt the price of its stock, which would be unthinkable in a company driven
by the need to constantly increase its share price. '  The markets it had cre-
ated in natural gas and wholesale electricity were maturing and profits from
trading were diminishing in response to increasing competition.'79 More-
over, Jeffrey Skilling's insistence that the company use mark-to-market ac-
counting placed tremendous pressure on corporate managers to show
constant revenue growth, even if that meant sacrificing cash flow."'
178 MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 14, at 92-94, 150-51, 154-55, 161, 236-37, 296, 318; POWERS
REPORT, supra note 11, at 36-37; Second Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner 15-22
(Jan. 21, 2003) [hereinafter, Second Batson Report]; Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the
Sudden Death of "'May, " 48 VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1250 (2003) ("The key factor sustaining Enron's abil-
ity to secure a low cost of capital was an investment grade credit rating.., which the major credit rating
agencies gave to Enron's debt from 1995 until November 2001."); Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1309-10.
179 Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Four (or Five) Easy Lessons from Enron, 55 VAND.
L. REV. 1787, 1801-02 (2002); Bratton, supra note 4, at 1299-1300.
180 Mark-to-market accounting permits a company to book as revenue the entire estimated value of
a stream of income from an asset. Cash will continue to flow in the door over the entire productive life
of the asset, but all of the revenue will be realized in the quarter in which it was booked. Not only was
this method highly susceptible to abuse in the form of fiddling with the estimated value of an asset, but it
also amplifies the pressure from Wall Street to show continuing growth. Because realizing all the future
profits when the asset is booked makes one quarter's revenue figures look good, it makes it that much
harder to show growth in the subsequent quarter. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY &
COMMERCE, LESSONS LEARNED FROM ENRON'S COLLAPSE: AUDITING THE ACCOUNTING INDUSTRY,
H.R. DOC. NO. 107-83, at 87 (Feb. 6, 2002) (statement of Bala G. Dharan) (claiming that mark-to-
market accounting, as applied to private contracts for the sale of assets that do not have readily ascer-
tainable market values, requires a great deal of guess work and assumptions about dozens of variables);
id. at 76 (statement of James S. Chanos) (explaining that under mark-to-market accounting, if assump-
tions are not borne out and assets actually decline in value, the reporting company must adjust their book
value downward, but in practice there is a powerful incentive to do new deals and book the value of
those new deals, using questionable assumptions, to mask the effect of the previous decline in asset val-
ues); Second Batson Report, supra note 178, at 22-28 (noting that mark-to-market accounting can create
a "quality of earnings" problem, because earnings are recognized long before the activity generates any
cash); id. at 29-32 (explaining how a transaction to provide video on demand, with content supplied by
Blockbuster, resulted in recognized gain of $53 million, even though Enron did not have the technology
to deliver the content, which Blockbuster in any event could not obtain from the studios); MCLEAN &
ELKIND, supra note 14, at 39-41, 126-29; Bratton, supra note 4, at 1303-04 (observing that no market
sets values for over-the-counter derivatives, so values must be obtained from economic models; since
Enron was at the cutting edge of creating new derivative products, generally accepted approaches to
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These incentives explain the motivation for most of the convoluted
transactions devised by Chief Financial Officer Andy Fastow. Fastow's in-
novation, if you can call it that, was to use techniques of structured financ-
ing and asset securitization to accomplish two principal goals: first, to
borrow money while keeping debt off the books; and second, to enable En-
ron to book the long-term value of a deal immediately under mark-to-
market accounting rules. 8 ' Significantly, Fastow's corporate finance de-
partment set up transactions to milk them for beneficial accounting treat-
ment-in terms of the substantive economics of the business, they did
nothing at all. This observation is crucial to evaluating the duties of the
lawyers who were employed to provide the documentation for the transac-
tions."2
Many of the Fastow transactions have become well known by names
such as Chewco, LJM 1 and LJM2, and the Raptors. These names refer to
special purpose entities (SPE's) which were set up as part of the deals.
SPE's are often used in the process of asset securitization, in which the
owners of some asset convert a stream of income over time into something
that could be repackaged as a security and sold immediately to investors in
the capital markets.'83 For example, a bank with many outstanding mort-
gage loans is entitled to receive monthly payments over the life of those
loans, but it may wish to convert those payments into a lump sum in cash
that it can use immediately. To do so, it "bundles" the mortgages and trans-
fers them to an SPE, which issues tradable financial instruments (mortgage-
backed securities), offered to investors at a discount relative to the present
value of the stream of payments. The investors make money because they
valuation did not exist); Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1309 n.2 (quoting e-mail communication between
an accounting professor at Duke's business school and the author, a highly sophisticated scholar of
structured finance, which incidentally illustrates how complex these transactions can be).
181 Structured finance techniques can be used for legitimate business purposes, such as enabling a
company to obtain lower-cost financing, transferring risk to parties who are better able to evaluate it,
and permitting the owner of illiquid but valuable assets to use them to obtain financing. See, e.g.,
HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, supra note 180, at 92-93 (statement of Bala G. Dharan);
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy ofAsset Securitization, I STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994).
182 Stephen Pepper offers the interesting observation that sophisticated clients may enjoy the bene-
fit of access to "more" law to the extent they can initiate the discussion of the legal effect of a particular
course of action. See Pepper, supra note 19, at 1581-82. Fastow's experience with accounting gim-
mickry gave him an advantage in the lawyer-client relationship, because he was able to suggest intricate,
law-evading transactions that might superficially comply with formal legal rules. By comparison, a less
sophisticated client who simply asked a lawyer to design a structure to accomplish some financial objec-
tive within the constraints of financial accounting rules might obtain access to "less" law because the
lawyer may not think of the elaborate structures that someone like Fastow devised. As Pepper notes, the
distinction between Fastow and the hypothetical unsophisticated client may not make a difference for
the ethical analysis if the law respecting the transactions is the same in both instances. The lawyer's
ethical obligation in either case is to give advice with respect to the law, and Fastow's superior ability to
manipulate the law means only that the lawyer may have to push back harder against his determination
to avoid legal regulation.
183 See generally MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 14, at 157-59.
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paid less for the securities than the income over time is worth. The bank is
happy because it has converted a formerly illiquid asset into cash.
The investors in these transactions are often investment banks who
deal with large corporations on a regular basis, and in Enron's case they
were subjected to a fair amount of bullying by Fastow.'84 The banks and
other institutional investors would often contribute funds directly to an SPE
created for the deal, which in turn purchased the asset from its owner. In all
of these transactions, the SPE is supposed to be independent of the seller of
the assets. But to be deemed independent, it actually need only have three
percent of its equity owned by a party unaffiliated with the seller.'85 (If the
SPE is independent, it need not be "consolidated"-i.e., reported on the fi-
nancial statements of the company that transferred assets to the SPE.)
Thus, if Citibank or J.P. Morgan contributed $3 million to an SPE and En-
ron contributed $97 million, Enron would be permitted to transfer assets to
the SPE and book the transaction as a bona fide sale to an independent
party. This situation was very much preferable, from Enron's perspective,
to a $100 million loan from the bank, which would have had an adverse ef-
fect on Enron's credit rating.
Although the legal and accounting requirements for transactions with
unconsolidated, off-balance-sheet SPE's are not terribly rigorous, Enron
had a hard time complying even with those.'86 Or, to put it differently, En-
ron was not interested in consummating a genuine transfer of assets to a
truly independent entity. Its motivation was rather to continue to realize the
economic benefits of owning the asset, preferably as operating income as
opposed to a one-time profit, but to move any debt associated with the ac-
quisition of the asset off its balance sheet. 87 In order to accomplish this
goal, Enron officers and employees, with the assistance of accountants and
lawyers, attempted to structure transactions that conformed to the letter of
financial accounting rules, while aggressively pushing the boundaries of
permissibility. To return to the image which opened this Article, the law-
yers and accountants were directed to create a duck, even though the trans-
actions (in more than one sense!) were a dog.
184 Id. at 162-65.
185 Bratton, supra note 4, at 1306 n. 118 (citing SEC and GAAP authorities for the three-percent
rule, and noting that while the SEC has consistently denied that the three-percent rule is a bright-line
test, it is generally understood as such by accountants).
186 Eventually Enron employed so many SPEs that it was impossible to find investors with capital
representing three percent of the valuation of all of the off-balance-sheet vehicles. See MCLEAN &
ELKIND, supra note 14, at 166, 189; POWERS REPORT, supra note 11, at 41 (explaining that the
"Chewco" partnership was created because Enron managers were having a hard time finding outside in-
vestors to finance a buyout of the JEDI joint venture).
187 Second Batson Report, supra note 178, at 36-39 (motivation for SPE transactions); MCLEAN &
ELKIND, supra note 14, at 368-69 (abuse of recurring vs. nonrecurring distinction); Schwarcz, supra
note 181, at 142-43 (legitimate use of off-balance-sheet financing).
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The duck-creating rules for SPE transactions can be summarized very
briefly as follows: 8'
* The SPE must be "bankruptcy remote" from the originating com-
pany (e.g., Enron), so that the originating company's credit risks
do not affect the risks associated with owning the securities of the
SPE.'1
9
* Bankruptcy remoteness depends, in turn, on the genuine transfer
of the economic risks and benefits associated with the assets from
the originating company to the SPE. 9° In other words, the trans-
fer must be a "true sale."19'
* If the SPE is not truly independent (i.e., bankruptcy remote) from
the originating company, the assets and liabilities of the SPE
must be consolidated on the financial statements of the originat-
ing company.' 92 Fleshing out the requirement of independent
ownership, financial accounting standards set a minimum of three
percent for the equity that must be contributed by entities unaf-
filiated with the originating company.9 3
" The independence of an SPE can be compromised by the originat-
ing company retaining control over the asset; this can be accom-
plished through side deals, such as loan guarantees, between the
originating company and the SPE, and may be shown by the
originating company's attempt to recognize gains in the value of
the SPE as earnings on its own balance sheet.'94
188 See generally FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND
SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITY-A REPLACEMENT OF FASB
STATEMENT NO. 125 (2000) (statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 140). Several reports
prepared under the supervision of the bankruptcy court provide useful summaries of the applicable fi-
nancial accounting standards. See, e.g., Report of Harrison J. Goldin, Court-Appointed Examiner in the
Enron North America Bankruptcy Proceeding, Respecting His Investigation of the Role of Certain Enti-
ties in Transactions Pertaining to Special Purpose Entities (Nov. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.enron.com/corp/por/supporting.html (last visited June 29, 2004) [hereinafter Goldin SPE
Report]. For the relevant legal standards, see STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (2d ed. 1993).
189 Schwarcz, supra note 181, at 135.
190 Second Batson Report, supra note 178, app. C at 9-11; POWERS REPORT, supra note 11, at 14;
Bratton, supra note 4, at 1306-07 (citing numerous GAAP authorities); Schwarcz, supra note 181, at
141.
191 Second Batson Report, supra note 178, at 37-38.
192 POWERS REPORT, supra note 11, at 38-39 (claiming that consolidation is a presumptive re-
quirement, and the presumption can be overcome only if two conditions are met, namely independence
of ownership and control of the SPE).
193 See supra note 185.
194 Second Batson Report, supra note 178, app. C at 12-13, 20-23; POWERS REPORT, supra note
11, at 36-37; Christine E. Earley et al., Some Thoughts on the Audit Failure at Enron, the Demise ofAn-
dersen, and the Ethical Climate of Public Accounting Firms, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1013, 1019-20 (2003)
(detailing side agreement between Enron and Michael Kopper, an Enron employee whose involvement
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Notice, however, that these norms are subject to manipulation or gam-
ing by lawyers who may be motivated to comply with them only formally.
A complete analysis of the appropriateness of the Enron transactions would
have to give additional content to those rules by tapping into the under-
standings of the relevant interpretive community, which are germane to the
exercise of interpretive judgment by lawyers and accountants. These prin-
ciples are relevant to interpretation and can constrain the exercise of judg-
ment, but only if the lawyer engaged in the process of interpretation belongs
to a community that is interested in maintaining a stable, publicly accessible
framework for cooperative activity. A lawyer who belongs to Andy Fas-
tow's interpretive community might be interested only in securing short-
term economic benefits for her client, or worse, for an individual agent of
her client. As I have argued, however, this interpretive stance cannot be
given a normative justification that reaches all the way down to the bedrock
of the social function of the law. If, on the other hand, a lawyer is inter-
ested in exercising judgment in a way that has plausible ethical foundations,
she will probably discover that the interpretive community recognizes cer-
tain norms that differentiate artificially created ducks from real ducks-that
is, distinguishing between transactions that are motivated only by the at-
tempt to create accounting results and those that have a real economic sub-
stance. In addition to the rules for duck-ness, there are principles regulating
interpretation that sort ducks from dogs dressed up as ducks, including:
" One of the benefits of SPE financing is "disintermediation," or the
reduction of transaction costs by removing intermediaries such as
banks from the financing process.195 A transaction involving
multiple intermediaries and a highly complex series of steps is
unlikely to result in the transaction cost savings that usually justi-
fies SPE transactions.
" Because SPE transactions can benefit both the originating com-
pany and investors in the SPE, one would expect a legitimate
transaction to be fully disclosed in a sufficiently clear manner.
One of the recurring themes of the commentary on the Enron
transactions is the opacity of the disclosures.'96 An undisclosed
need not be disclosed as a related-party transaction, guaranteeing loan from Barclay's Bank to Kopper,
for the purpose of acquiring a three-percent interest in Chewco, an SPE run by Andy Fastow); Schwarcz,
supra note 181, at 136. Enron used complex financial devices, such as a transaction it called a Total Re-
turn Swap, to retain the benefits of an asset transferred to an SPE. Second Batson Report, supra note
178, app. C at 16-18.
195 Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1315.
196 See, e.g., POWERs REPORT, supra note 11, at 192; Bratton, supra note 4, at 1281 (calling finan-
cial statements "famously opaque"). The reaction of James Chanos, a sophisticated Wall Street hedge
fund manager, is typical: "We read the footnotes in Enron's financial statements about these transac-
tions over and over again, and.., we could not decipher what impact they had on Enron's overall finan-
cial condition." Chanos, supra note 180, at 73; see also SWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 10, at xi-xiii,
331 (reporting anecdote of Houston financial advisor who did not recommend Enron stock because he
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transaction or one that is camouflaged in layers of obfuscating
legalese should alert lawyers and accountants that something is
fishy.
197
* Additional caution is warranted when other aspects of the transac-
tion are aggressive. For example, in the LJM transactions, Enron
capitalized the SPEs with $1.2 billion of its own common stock,
in exchange for notes issued by the SPEs. This is a once-
disfavored funding mechanism, and GAAP requires that Enron
reduce shareholder equity in the amount of the newly issued
shares until the SPE pays down the notes. 9 Use of this kind of
capitalization scheme, and the failure of Enron to account for the
transaction properly, should have put professionals on notice that
other aspects of the transaction should be scrutinized carefully.
" The financial accounting system in general is intended to provide
transparent, accurate, easily understood information to managers,
creditors, and investors regarding the financial condition of the
reporting company) 9 If it appears that managers are valuing
complexity for its own sake, it could be a red flag warning to
lawyers and accountants that the transaction is intended to ma-
nipulate the numbers on the company's financial statements,
rather than accomplish some economically useful end.
Like the disciplining rules that differentiate between legitimate struc-
turing to capture favorable tax treatment from bogus tax shelters, these
principles of interpretation are not binary, all-or-nothing rules. There is no
algorithmic way to capture the process of reasoning from these principles to
a correct application of the law to an SPE transaction. For this reason, there
may be hard cases in which competent lawyers disagree over whether a
given transaction is permissible, and there may be cases in which some
lawyers are more aggressive than others in pushing the boundaries of the
rules. This is as it should be. My claim is not that the appropriately con-
strained judgment of interpretive communities produces a single right an-
swer in every case. Rather, the limit on lawyers' creativity that prevents it
could not make sense of its financial statements and Warren Buffet's statement that he never understood
how Enron made money). Indeed, the complexity of some of the SPE transactions, such as the "Raptor"
hedges, made it difficult even for internal Enron managers to know how a given business unit was per-
forming. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 179, at 1804-06.
197 1 take the point that some structured finance transactions can be so complex that disclosure is
necessarily imperfect-either it oversimplifies the transaction or it provides so much detail that it goes
over the head of most investors. See Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1316-17. When a transaction becomes
this complicated, the clarity of the disclosure language, by itself, is an insufficient indication of abuse.
In a case like this, however, professionals have a heightened obligation of inquiry and should rely even
more heavily on other factors to guide their interpretation of the relevant legal and accounting standards.
198 Bratton, supra note 4, at 1314-15.
199 Second Batson Report, supra note 178, app. B at 3-5.
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from degenerating into undue aggressiveness is the requirement of public
justifiability. A lawyer must be prepared, in principle, to articulate a reason
why the legal treatment (for tax, accounting, bankruptcy, etc., purposes) of
a transaction is legitimate, in light of the end sought to be advanced by the
regulatory regime in question. In the case of the Enron SPE transactions
reviewed in the Powers and Batson reports, there is simply no plausible jus-
tification available. Fastow and his confederates had manipulated the tech-
niques of structured financing to produce spurious accounting results which
had no relationship whatsoever to the underlying economics of the transac-
tions. Their abuse was abetted by the Holmesian bad man attitudes of law-
yers and accountants, who in effect agreed with Fastow that if the rules do
not explicitly prohibit an act, it is permissible.
3. Legal Restraints on Torture.-The invasion of Afghanistan in the
wake of the September 11 attacks resulted in the capture of numerous de-
tainees with possible al-Qaeda affiliation, who might have possessed infor-
mation on the structure of the organization, personnel, or even future
terrorist attacks. The Bush administration was therefore faced with an ur-
gent question regarding the limits it should impose on interrogation tech-
niques. Officials in the Department of Defense and advisers to the
president naturally turned to lawyers to interpret and apply the domestic and
international legal norms governing the treatment of prisoners.2"' The re-
sulting memos, prepared by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Coun-
sel, were leaked to the press and quickly dubbed the "torture memos."
They were eventually disclosed by the White House and are now widely
available in electronic form.20 ' The memos consider a wide range of legal
issues, from whether the Geneva Convention protections afforded to pris-
200 There is considerable uncertainty in the law of lawyering over the identity of the client repre-
sented by federal government lawyers. As one commentator put it, on any given day the lawyer's client
might be identified as a particular agency, an agency official, the executive branch of the government,
the United States as a whole, or the public interest. See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advo-
cacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L.
REV. 951, 955 (1991). Specifically with regard to the Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC"), there is contro-
versy over how the role of OLC lawyers should be understood, with positions arrayed on a continuum
between litigation-style advocacy on the one hand, and neutral judge-style reasoning on the other. See
John 0. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive,
and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 375 (1993); Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch
Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1303, 1305-
06 (2000). It should be clear that my sympathies lean toward the latter extreme, what Moss calls the
"neutral expositor" model. In terms of the client-identity question, though, there is less controversy that
OLC lawyers in particular, as opposed to government lawyers in general, owe their loyalty and obliga-
tion to render candid advice to an identifiable government official, namely the President. Moss, supra,
at 1316-17. Thus, when I use the term "client" in this section I refer to the President and his top-level
advisors.
201 Two useful collections of the memos are FindLaw, at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/
62204index.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2004), and the National Security Archive at George Washington
University, at http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/index.htm (last visited Dec. 7,
2004).
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oners of war extend to suspected Taliban or al-Qaeda detainees, to whether
the President's power as Commander in Chief could be limited by an act of
Congress criminalizing mistreatment of prisoners. One of the most notori-
ous memos concluded that certain methods of interrogation might be cruel,
inhuman, or degrading, yet fall outside the definition of prohibited acts of
torture. °2 Moreover, even if an act were deemed torture, the memo con-
cluded that it might be justified by self-defense or necessity.
Contrary to the suggestion by one of the authors of the memos that crit-
ics are implying that it is taboo even to ask legal questions about torture,"
3 I
do not perceive anything inherently wrong with the administration's deci-
sion to seek advice on the application of the law governing torture. The law
governing what may be done to a given class of prisoners is quite complex,
involving the overlapping norms of international, military, domestic crimi-
nal, and constitutional law. As government officials considered the interro-
gation of detainees ex ante, they could reasonably have worried that an act
that did not appear to an ordinary observer to constitute torture might never-
theless contravene some technical legal rule. For example, the Geneva
Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war prohibits "outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading 
treatment, 2 4
which conceivably might be interpreted to include what domestic law en-
forcement personnel would regard as relatively innocuous interrogation tac-
tics. The Army runs a school that teaches intelligence officers how to
extract information from unwilling detainees, and although it trains soldiers
to "lie .. .prey on a prisoner's ethnic stereotypes, sexual urges and reli-
gious prejudices," it nevertheless also claims to respect governing legal
norms against torture, as opposed to harsh interrogation techniques.
20
' To
put the point in Hartian terms, the language of any prohibition on torture
will contain a core prohibition of clearly immoral acts, with a penumbra of
application to cases in which the immorality is not clear.
20
' Thus, it is not
immoral to seek legal advice on how to avoid the prohibition on a plainly
immoral act, as long as the actor intends to commit a morally permitted, but
possibly legally prohibited act.
It is also important to be careful about the role of moral and policy
considerations in the process of giving legal advice. John Yoo, one of the
202 See Aug. 1 OLC Memo, supra note 17.
203 See Liptak, supra note 18 (quoting John Yoo's statement that "[s]ome critics of the Justice De-
partment's work seem to assume that it is politically incorrect to ask the meaning of a publicly 
enacted
law").
204 See Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signa-
ture Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3(l)(c), 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
205 See Sanford Levinson, "Precommitment" and "Postcommitment": The Ban on Torture in the
Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REv. 2013, 2025 (2003) (quoting Jess Bravin, Interrogation School
Tells Army Recruits How Grilling Works; 30 Techniques in 16 Weeks, Just Short of Torture; Do They
Yield Much?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2002, at Al).
206 See HART, supra note 27, at 144-47.
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principal drafters of the torture memos, has argued that the Justice Depart-
ment lawyers were not asked to consider policy or moral issues." 7 From
this fact about the instructions given to the lawyers, Yoo seeks to infer the
conclusion that moral and policy considerations should be somehow her-
metically separated from legal advice. As Yoo argues: "[T]he memo
sought to answer a discrete question: What is the meaning of 'torture' un-
der the federal criminal laws? What the law permits and what policymakers
chose to do are entirely different things."2 8 True enough, but it may be the
case that "[w]hat the law permits" cannot be determined without reference
to moral considerations. Consider, for example, the analysis of the neces-
sity defense to federal criminal liability under the statute implementing the
international Convention Against Torture.2"9 The Justice Department's
memo on the Convention concludes that a necessity defense should be
available to a charge of having violated the federal statute."' On the stan-
dard formulation of the necessity defense, the trier of fact is called upon to
decide whether the actor promoted higher-valued goods at the expense of
lesser values; if so, the act was justified by the necessity.' This evaluation
in effect incorporates moral values by reference into the application of legal
rules, because "[t]he actor and the court that judges him must know what is
good and bad, beneficial and harmful, and it must know comparatively what
sorts of things are worse than others." ' Moreover, to the extent courts and
other legal officials have consistently invoked moral considerations to jus-
tify their decisions, they are deemed part of law by the rule of recognition
prevalent in the legal system.213 When the lawyers were asked to interpret
the law governing torture, there was no way for them to avoid dealing with
moral and policy issues." 4
207 See John C. Yoo, A Critical Look at Torture Law, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 2004, at B 11.
208 Id.; see also Posner & Vermeule, supra note 16 ("[T]he Justice Department lawyers ... were
not asked for moral or political advice .... ").
209 The federal statute implementing the convention is 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2000). The full
title of the relevant convention is Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
210 See Aug. 1 OLC Memo, supra note 17, at 39-41.
211 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.4(a) (3d ed. 2000). The authors of the memos fol-
lowed this formulation of the necessity defense. See Aug. 1 OLC Memo, supra note 17, at 39-40;
Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism 25-26 (March 6,
2003), available at http://www.cdi.org/news/law/pentagon-torture-memo.pdf [hereinafter Working
Group Report].
212 Moore, supra note 86, at 286. Joseph Raz argues that the law does not incorporate morality by
reference in this case, because the decisionmaker is already required to take moral considerations into
account; the law merely reiterates that it does not exclude moral considerations from the decision. See
Raz, supra note 144. Whether one prefers to see the issue as non-exclusion or incorporation, the point
remains that the interpretation of the law as such requires reference to moral values.
213 See Hart, supra note 77, at 265.
214 In any event, it is highly disingenuous for Yoo to defend the memos by claiming that lawyers
were not asked to give policy advice when the memos contain extensive discussion of policy issues.
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Similarly, some of the government lawyers' arguments make sense
only from an artificially narrow perspective, focused only on particular le-
gal texts divorced from their historical and policy contexts. Administration
officials referred repeatedly to the novel nature of the conflict with al-
Qaeda, implying that the law ought to be interpreted less rigorously. 215 This
argument is blocked, however, by specific provisions in the international
law against torture. The 1984 Convention Against Torture contains a non-
derogation provision, which bluntly states that "[n]o exceptional circum-
stances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal politi-
cal instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a
justification of torture. ' ' 2 6 The non-derogation language was included spe-
cifically to prevent states from attempting to define a category of crimen
exceptum, or crimes so dangerous to society that law enforcement officials
should be permitted extraordinary latitude. 7 The enactment history of the
1984 Convention shows that an argument from the unprecedented nature of
the conflict with al-Qaeda is simply going to be a nonstarter. States fre-
quently try to justify torture as a reasonable self-defense measure against an
extraordinary threat, which is precisely why the non-derogation provision
was included in the Convention. Calling this a "policy" argument, and then
trying to argue that the government had not asked for policy advice, misses
the point that it may be impossible to ascertain the content of the law with-
out reference to policy considerations.
Not only did the government lawyers exclude moral, policy, and his-
torical considerations from their analysis, but they ignored other clearly
See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales and William J. Haynes 25-28 (Jan.
22, 2002). The discussion of necessity, in particular, specifically acknowledges that "the purpose behind
necessity is one of public policy." Aug. 1 OLC Memo, supra note 17, at 40; Working Group Report,
supra note 211, at 25.
215 See, e.g., the statements of White House Counsel Gonzales accompanying the release of the
memos:
America today does face a different kind of enemy in al Qaeda and its affiliates. And we face an
enemy that targets innocent civilians, and we have seen certainly graphic evidence of that in recent
days. We face an enemy that lies in the shadows, an enemy that doesn't sign treaties, they don't
wear uniforms, an enemy that owes no allegiance to any country, they do not cherish life. An en-
emy that doesn't fight, attack or plan according to accepted laws of war, in particular Geneva
Conventions.
Press Briefing, White House Counsel Judge Alberto Gonzales (Jun. 22, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2 004/O6/
2 0 0 4 06 2 2 -14.html; see also Draft Memorandum
from Alberto R. Gonzales to the President 3 (Jan. 25, 2002) ("[T]his is a new type of warfare-one not
contemplated in 1949 when [the Geneva Convention] was framed ...."). Again it is ironic to read de-
fenders of the administration arguing that lawyers should engage only in formalistic "legal" interpreta-
tion, while at the same time invoking historical and policy-based considerations in support of their own
legal arguments.
216 Convention Against Torture, supra note 209, art. 2(2). In ratifying the treaty, the United States
stated reservations to the definition of torture (evidently to exempt capital punishment from the reach of
the Convention) but it did not state any reservations to the non-derogation provision in Article 2(2). See
Levinson, supra note 205, at 2014-16.
217 See EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE 6 (2d ed. 1996).
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relevant legal texts and traditional techniques for interpreting texts. In other
words, even if the lawyers believed they were justified in adopting a textu-
alist style of interpretation, they did a lousy job at textualism. Consider, for
example, the memorandum which concluded that an act constitutes torture
under a federal statute only if, inter alia, the actor specifically intended to
cause severe physical mental pain or suffering, with "severe" defined in
terms of other federal statutes defining a medical emergency for the purpose
of establishing a right to health benefits.218 To put it mildly, it is peculiar to
make an argument analogizing "severe pain" for the purposes of a statute
prohibiting torture with another statute defining an emergency as involving
a "serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part." The health benefits
statute notes, almost in passing, that in an emergency the patient will ex-
hibit symptoms including severe pain. This is not a definition of severe
pain in terms of organ dysfunction. It is a definition of emergency in terms
of organ dysfunction with possible accompanying severe pain. Imagine a
definition of "winter" as "a season whose manifestations include snow, ice,
and cold weather." It does not follow from that definition that cold weather
is weather in which there is snow--obviously enough it can be cold outside
and not snowing. Similarly, a person can experience severe pain (and be
entitled to health benefits under the statute) without being in imminent
jeopardy of organ failure or dysfunction.
The government lawyers would not have made this definitional mis-
take if they had used a different set of texts for their argument by analogy.
In addition to the statute under consideration, implementing the 1984 Con-
vention Against Torture, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
adopted regulations implementing the Convention, permitting aliens other-
wise subject to removal to apply for an exemption on the ground that he or
she would be subject to torture if returned or extradited to another coun-
try.2"9 The regulations define torture as "any act by which severe pain or
suffering .. .is intentionally inflicted.""22 Unsurprisingly, there is a sub-
stantial body of cases interpreting the term "torture" in the context of immi-
gration proceedings,2 2' none of which were cited in the Justice Department
memo. Perhaps these cases are distinguishable, but their omission is strik-
ing in the context of an analysis of the term "severe pain" in a torture-
related statute. Surely they are better analogies for the criminal prohibition
on torture than the statute authorizing health benefits for patients experienc-
ing a medical emergency.
This kind of crabbed argumentation strongly suggests that the lawyers
218 See Aug. 1 OLC Memo, supra note 17, at 5-6 (citing the health benefits statutes).
219 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.11-208.3 (1999).
220 Id. § 2 08.18(a)(1).
221 See, e.g., Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 472 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that rape can constitute
torture); Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that electric shocks to the geni-
tals, beatings, and suspension from rotating ceiling fans can constitute torture).
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had a motive other than providing their client with an impartial and objec-
tive analysis of the law. There is nothing wrong with advising a client to
take a novel or creative position under existing law, in the hope that a legal
official might treat the client's position favorably. If transactional lawyers
were permitted to give only the most conservative legal advice, a significant
avenue for legal change would be closed off. If a lawyer's advice is crea-
tive and the client's position is unlikely to prevail, however, the lawyer
owes an obligation to explain this clearly to the client, so that the client can
decide whether to incur the risk of an unfavorable ruling.222 One of the
striking things about the whole set of Justice Department memos is that
they do not acknowledge how far out of the mainstream their position is,
with respect to executive power, the application of international legal
norms, the construction of federal statutes, and other legal issues they ad-
dress. Two of the defenders of the government lawyers argue, in effect, that
the position taken in the memos, particularly with respect to executive
power, is so cutting edge that it has wrongly been thought crazy rather than
innovative.223 The trouble with this defense is that nowhere in the memos
do the authors flag the argument as a challenge to received wisdom. In-
stead, it is presented without qualification, almost blandly, as a factual re-
port on what the law is, not what it might be if the innovative arguments of
the authors were accepted.
As suggested previously, the explanation for the poor quality of the le-
gal analysis in the memos may be the attitude that the lawyers were in-
structed-perhaps expressly, but likely tacitly-to adopt when analyzing
legal restrictions on torture. According to published reports, the administra-
tion repeated the mantra "forward-leaning" to describe the type of advice it
wanted.224 Lawyers were expected to take risks, think outside the box, and
in effect approach the law from an adversarial point of view, rather than as
a set of legitimate reasons upon which to act. This direction from the "cli-
ent" is quite likely to have biased the lawyers' advice by causing them to
adopt a Holmesian bad man attitude toward the law. If this stance is trou-
blesome in the context of taxation and financial accounting, it seems almost
monstrous when applied to law that is aimed at protecting the most funda-
mental aspects of human dignity. The obvious context and purpose of cer-
tain categories of law compels individuals and lawyers not just to avoid
violations, but to "avoid avoidance." That is, some kinds of laws command
citizens, in effect, not to calibrate their actions finely in close proximity to
222 The state bar disciplinary rules in effect in most jurisdictions require a lawyer to "explain a mat-
ter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the rep-
resentation." MODEL RULES, supra note 20, R. 1.4(b).
223 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 16 (arguing that the "conventional view" of executive
power "has been challenged in recent years by a dynamic generation of younger scholars" including
John Yoo).
224 See Tim Golden, After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004,
at Al.
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legal boundaries. Jeremy Waldron offers a nice example: "Someone for
whom the important question is 'How much may I flirt with my student be-
fore it counts as harassment?' is already poorly positioned with regard to
the concerns underlying harassment law." '225 In the case of harassment, as
well as torture, the nature of the prohibited activity exerts a feedback effect
on the attitude that one should take when interpreting the law. It is not
"routine lawyerly stuff' at all to ignore these interpretive norms; rather, the
intelligibility of the law depends on them.
I want to make clear a perhaps unsettling implication of the lawyer's
duty to apply the law as it actually is, as opposed to the way the lawyer
would like it to be. If the law, properly interpreted, prohibits a certain inter-
rogation technique, then it is irrelevant if a government official would pre-
fer a more "forward-leaning" approach to dealing with detainees. But, if
the law permits a technique, such as the use of "stress positions," sleep dep-
rivation, or bombardment by lights and sound,226 then the lawyer's belief
that these techniques are morally wrong should be excluded from the law-
yer's analysis of the law. The law governing lawyers permits (but does not
require) a lawyer to advise a client on the basis of relevant "moral, eco-
nomic, social and political factors." '227 Thus, there is nothing wrong with
saying to the client, in effect, "That is legal but it is a rotten thing to do."
(That was exactly the reaction of the State Department to the White House
Counsel's advice that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the conflict
in Afghanistan.228) If the client has heard that advice, however, and still de-
cides to go forward with a course of action that the lawyer finds morally
wrong, the lawyer's obligation is to assist the client, regardless of her moral
objection. The reason is the settlement and coordination function of the law
that is the centerpiece of this approach to legal ethics.
People disagree in good faith over the morality of harsh interrogation
techniques, even outright torture, and the scope of cases in which it should
be permissible. Judge Posner has argued that no one should be in a position
of public responsibility who doubts that, if the stakes are high enough, tor-
ture is permissible.229 Naturally there are others who maintain that torture is
225 Waldron, supra note 90, at 535-36 n.66.
226 See Levinson, supra note 205, at 2027 (quoting Bravin, supra note 205, at AI (discussing mili-
tary's protocols for conducting harsh investigations)); Don Van Natta, Jr., Questioning Terror Suspects
in a Dark and Surreal World, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at Al (reporting on interrogation techniques
used by U.S. personnel).
227 MODEL RULES, supra note 20, R. 2.1; see also Pepper, supra note 19, at 1563-64.
228 See Memorandum from William H. Taft IV to Counsel for the President (Feb. 2, 2002).
229 Richard A. Posner, The Best Offense, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 2002, at 28, 30; see also Mark
Bowden, The Dark Art of Interrogation, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2003, at 51, 76 ("[C]oercion is an
issue that is rightly handled with a wink[;]... it should be banned but also quietly practiced.").
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never permissible, even in so-called "ticking bomb" cases.23° Then there are
a variety of middle-ground positions, including doubts about the gener-
alizability of the ticking bomb hypothetical,23' and attempts to qualify the
limited permissibility of torture with various democratic process controls.232
There are undoubtedly cases on which all would agree that torture is wrong,
but there are circumstances in which thoughtful and fully informed citizens
would reasonably disagree about the moral acceptability of a certain tech-
nique, or whether it deserves the normatively laden ascription "torture."
Because of the shared interest in working together on the common project
of national defense within a constitutional framework that protects human
rights, individuals have set up a system of legal procedures for resolving
these normative conflicts. Insofar as they are engaging in practical, rather
than theoretical reasoning, they have a second-order moral reason to respect
the law's position on one of these questions.233 No matter how serious or
strongly felt the lawyer's moral objection to the law, the law nevertheless
dictates what is permissible in the context of the attorney-client relation-
ship, absent some kind of catastrophic moral horror.3 Even if the lawyer
believes, as many do, that the present climate of fear has made us too will-
ing to discard humanitarian considerations, lawmaking is a democratic
process, and the lawyer's conscience cannot trump the result of fair proce-
230 See, e.g., Oren Gross, The Prohibition on Torture and the Limits of the Law, in TORTURE (San-
ford Levinson ed., 2004); Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124 (1978); Anthony Lewis, Mak-
ing Torture Legal, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 15, 2004, at 4.
231 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 86; see also Winfried Brugger, May Government Ever Use Tor-
ture? Two Responses from German Law, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 661 (2000).
232 See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS (2002) (proposing "torture war-
rants" to subject interrogations to judicial oversight); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL:
POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2004) (arguing for constraints like transparency and account-
ability).
233 For the terminology of first- and second-order reasons, and the argument for the authority of
law, see Wendel, supra note 6, at 365, 376-84.
234 To the obvious rejoinder that torture is a paradigmatic case of a catastrophic moral horror, the
response is that it is true in some cases. The politically motivated torture of opponents of the govern-
ment in order to silence dissent, or the wholly gratuitous torture of innocent detainees, would count as a
catastrophic moral horror, and no legal permission to engage in these acts would preempt the lawyer's
first-order moral reasons not to take part in it. But the cases we are concerned about here do not fall
within the core of clear moral catastrophes because one could believe in the permissibility of using coer-
cive or pain-inducing interrogation techniques in some cases, on some suspects, given a sufficiently
compelling justification. In order to be warranted in "opting out" of the authority of law, a lawyer must
believe not only that the law is wrong, but that anyone who disagrees is completely failing to function as
a moral agent, or is "massively, corruptly, stupidly wrong," as I have previously put the point. See id. at
417 n.190. A community is justified in shunning a citizen whose moral beliefs are so clearly beyond the
pale that it would be impossible to engage in cooperative, peaceful coexistence with the individual. To
the extent a person's views are wrong, but not so wrong that the person should be shunned, those views
are part of the background of normative debate that makes it necessary to establish democratic and legal
procedures in order to facilitate cooperative endeavors. Thus, lawyers acting in a representative capacity
are obligated to respect the resolution achieved by the legal system, with respect to positions that are
within the range of good faith moral disagreement.
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dures where the law on point is clear. As a private citizen, the lawyer is
free to lobby or protest the law; the lawyer may withdraw from representing
the client; and the lawyer may employ legal channels (with the client's con-
sent, of course) on behalf of the client to attempt to change the law. But the
negative aspect of professionalism, which is an implication of the authority
conception of legal ethics, precludes reference to first-order moral reasons,
except to the extent they are incorporated into law or made relevant to the
interpretation of law by the conventional practices of courts and lawyers.
IV. CONCLUSION
In response to public criticism of the role of lawyers in the corporate
scandals which came to light in 2002, lawyers argued that they were simply
responding rationally to the competitive pressures of the marketplace.
Similarly, one excuse offered by apologists for the so-called torture memos
is that the lawyers were responding to administration pressure to think "out-
side the box" in the war on terrorism. In both of these cases, we are sup-
posed to grant normative significance to the fact that clients desire
aggressive and creative lawyers who are willing to walk right up to the line
between legality and illegality, and even push the boundaries if necessary.
Lawyers and accountants have described how clients demand, "Show me
where it says I can't do that," '235 when professionals raise concerns about
suspicious transactions. In the end, however, it is not for clients to say what
the law is. If the client demands that the lawyer paste an orange plastic
beak on a dog and call it a duck, the lawyer's response must be that the
rules may appear to permit creating ducks out of dogs, but that the law
properly interpreted would characterize the creature as a dog. Legal rules
are not self-interpreting, and a conclusion about what the law says, with re-
spect to some transaction, depends on the interpretive attitude that one takes
toward the rules. The instrumentalist attitude, which treats the law as
merely an obstacle to be planned around, cannot be justified in terms of the
social function of law, which is to permit people to coordinate their activi-
ties in a complex, highly legalistic society. Recognizing this function of
law, professional communities have developed what we can refer to as dis-
ciplining rules, principles of interpretation, or regulative norms that stabi-
lize interpretation and permit discrimination between legitimate and
illegitimate constructions of law. Lawyers reasoning on the basis of these
disciplining rules, can articulate criteria for the exercise of professional
judgment, which are justified on the basis of the purposes standing behind
the regime of law that applies in a given domain.
This Article has set out a theory of legal ethics which is grounded in
fidelity to the law. Professionalism, in the sense we have been discussing
235 Cf Fundamental Causes of the Accounting Debacle at Enron: Show Me Where It Says I Can 't:
Summary of Testimony Before the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (Feb. 6, 2002)
(statement of Roman L. Weil), available at http://gsb.uchicago.edu/pdf/weiltestimony.pdf.
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here, does not mean that the lawyer's responsibility is to do right on an all-
things-considered basis. Nor is the lawyer acting as an individual moral
agent, doing right by her own lights. The lodestar here is always an inter-
pretation of applicable legal norms. Because we disagree in good faith and,
in many cases intractably, it is unrealistic to expect the process of moral
reasoning alone to provide a stable framework for cooperative social activ-
ity. The law has authority to the extent it permits us to move beyond moral
disagreement and settle on a common framework for action. As a corollary
to this theory of authority, lawyers must not be permitted to unsettle the set-
tlement, and to evade the requirements that have been laid down by a pro-
cedural mechanism for resolving moral conflict. The Holmesian bad man
attitude toward the law would have exactly that effect. For this reason, it is
an unacceptable interpretive stance to take toward the law.
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